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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Thomas Kuhn is renowned for having affirmed both
dogmatic and revolutionary aspects of scientific inquiry.
His is a difficult-- and some would say even incoherent-mix, however.

Among the many central achievements of

science and scientific method that Kuhn's mix purportedly
threatens to undermine, few are as dear as the idea of
progress.

The questions which get presented to Kuhn are

typically along the lines of the following:

How can

dogmatism open itself to the kind of revolutionary critique
which claims to comprise science's most dramatic advances?
And yet, how can revolutionary critique measure the success
it claims, if not against a frame of reference which can
bridge the gap opened by the revolutionary break, and
thereby offer points of comparison?
The treatment of Kuhn's philosophy of science that will
be presented in the first chapter attempts to correct
certain misconceptions of his position, and prepares the way
for a clearer statement of the kind of complementarity
between dogmatism and revolution that can answer the two
questions just stated above.

Ultimately, for Kuhn--and as

we shall see, for Blumenberg--the affirmation of progress
requires an affirmation of complementarity between
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revolutionary breaks and tradition continuity.
We will see that, for Kuhn, the dogmatic side of
science--normal science--is not inert.

Its offer of

stability incorporates its own distinctive dynamic.

Normal

science is not, therefore, a stable, entrenched mass
consistently eroded under the pressure of falsification or
falsifying criticism.

It is not simply a target for

criticism.
For Kuhn, all of science proceeds by means of a logic
of provocation and response, and it is within the terms of
this logic that the nature and function of normal science
should be understood.

The adoption of a paradigm is

simultaneously the displacement of another.

But this choice

is not simply according to falsificationist standards, but
also according to the concrete standards imposed by each
paradigm.

Many commentators, as we will see, have missed

the functional role Kuhn assigns to the previous paradigm
both in provoking the emergence of a new paradigm, and in
setting specific standards for what can qualify as a new
paradigm.
In chapter two we will learn that Popper, against whom
Kuhn may seem to be defining his position, also recognizes
the dogmatism Kuhn has identified.

Insofar as he does, he

too must provide an account of the complementarity between
dogmatism and criticism.
Popper interprets the role of dogmatism in inquiry as
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helping to identify where the power of our accepted theories
lie.

The importance of this identification is that it

allows for an assessment of the progress achieved through
revolutions.

Popper therefore does affirm that criticism

remains accountable to the framework it would reject.
However, as we will see, this very accountability raises
serious questions about his beliefs in the steady
availability of "framework-breaking" or "revolutions in
permanence."
In chapter three we will see how the hermeneutic
philosophy of Hans Georg Gadamer clarifies and develops the
issue of the complementarity between dogmatism and criticism
by means of his rehabilitation of the idea of tradition.
Specifically, Gadamer's hermeneutics will allow us to see
how a "framework" is not simply an obstacle to knowledge, a
negative condition restricting our gaze, but is also a
positive, enabling condition which can open us to, and serve
as a medium for, new experiences--experiences which both
falsify and confirm various aspects of our framework
(tradition) .
Gadamer's hermeneutics, however, for all its virtues in
support of Kuhn's struggle against Popper's imperative for
permanent revolution, ultimately fails to provide Kuhn with
a viable concept of revolution.

At best, Gadamer's

understanding of the complementarity of dogmatism and
criticism contextualizes that complementarity within a
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reform-oriented (not a revolution-oriented) tradition.

But

Kuhn himself deploys the concept of revolution--and
decidedly not the concept of reform.
In chapter four I will argue that the work of Hans
Blumenberg underwrites the requisite notion of revolution
that Kuhn requires.

Blumenberg's work, I will suggest, in

some senses builds upon the hermeneutics of Gadamer.
Specifically, I will argue that Blumenberg's descriptions of
a revolutionary text not only assist Kuhn, but develop the
idea of the "classical" that has been central to Gadamer's
work, but which has been subjected to much criticism for its
conservative, and perhaps even reactionary and ideological
implications.
Blumenberg will affirm both the logic of provocation
and response (Kuhn), and the logic of question and answer
(Gadamer), but develop these in important ways.
Specifically, he will differentiate these logics (or,
rather, this logic, since it is actually one) into two
components:

the concept of reoccupation, and the idea that

the history of what leads up to an event conditions the
history of that event's effects.

By means of this

differentiation, Blumenberg will both affirm the possibility
of revolution as well as the requisite stable background
against which any change must be measured.

In short, he

will establish his own complementarity between dogmatism and
criticism.
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Blumenberg's fundamental claim is that revolutions, as
pathways out of aporetic situations {crisis), do not require
the shattering of the identity of the dynamic which gave
rise to the crisis situation--they do not, that is, require
the shattering of the framework of answer positions to
pressing questions.

This does not mean that the questions

{much less the answers) remain the same.

Instead, new

determinations of a question are possible by means of
revolutionary answers {exemplary problem solutions, in
Kuhn's terms).

However--and this is crucial to Blumenberg's

affirmation of continuity--such novel determinations of the
questions often conceal the fact that these answers reoccupy
old question positions.

Revolutions, then, for Blumenberg

{and for Kuhn), succeed when they reoccupy the positions of
the old framework--not reconfirm them, as Gadamer would have
it, nor cancel them, as Popper would.
Finally, I will argue in the conclusion that
Blumenberg's concept of the reoccupation of the framework of
answer positions satisfies the conditions for continuity
against which progress can be identified.

CHAPTER TWO
REVOLUTIONARY SCIENCE AND ITS PROBLEMS
The focus of this chapter is a critical examination of
the innovation most generally recognized as a significant
contribution by Kuhn to the philosophy of science:
of normal science.

the idea

For Kuhn, the rationality of scientific

revolutions can only be explained on the basis of the
dynamic represented by normal science.

The idea of normal

science, I will argue, permits Kuhn to modify the idea of
11

crisis 11 --the context within which revolutions take place.

This crisis-context is not simply a free forum, without
operative standards, within which incommensurable paradigms
fight for the right to impose their own standards and
compete for hegemony, nor is it a free-for-all in which
isolated paradigms fail to communicate with another at the
same time that they compete for attention. 1 Rather, the
crisis state already emerges with preliminarily operative
1 Exactly what Kuhn might mean by "paradigm" has been
the subject of considerable discussion. See, for example,
Masterman (1970) . By "paradigm" I will generally mean that
sense specified by Kuhn according to which certain problem
solutions serve a global normative status (vs. a merely
local status as the particular solution they are), and
become exemplary guides for research. It has been suggested
by Thomas Nickles that this sense is Kuhn's contribution to
the resolution of the problem of underdetermination
(Callebaut 1993:52-3).
6
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standards borne by the previous dominant paradigm, which
establish burdens for competing paradigms to meet.
The chapter consists of three sections.

The first

section is primarily expository, although its purpose is to
identify precisely whom Kuhn is attacking, since this is not
as obvious as one might expect.

For example, Kuhn's writing

style creates ambiguities in the presentation of his
thought, which makes the identification of what is new
within it more challenging than it need be.

His positions,

for instance, sometimes appear to be more radical or
innovative than they actually are.

His characteristic

'mincing' of words, on the other hand, makes him appear more
tentative.

My own interpretation of Kuhn understands him to

be considerably more conservative than his initial
reception, and some subsequent ones as well, indicated.
Many of Kuhn's more 'radical' statements about scientific
method, I will show, appear to be such only because of the
infallibilist versions of method against which he projects
his own views.

Does Kuhn take seriously the fallibilist

accounts of scientific method that were already active when
he wrote The Structure of Scientific Revolutions? 2 This is
the question which concludes the first section of the
chapter.

It will be treated at length only in the second

chapter.

2 For example, those of Popper, Lakatos, and Quine-and, even, those of Peirce and Dewey.
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The second section of the chapter pits Kuhn against
Larry Laudan, who clearly believes that Kuhn's position
falls into relativism.

Against that position, Laudan offers

his own problem-solving approach.

Although I think Laudan's

position misses the mark, I am not setting him up as a straw
man.

Rather, Laudan's misunderstanding of Kuhn's position

provides the transition to an account of Kuhn's modification
of the idea of crisis--a modification Laudan clearly misses.
The final section of the chapter explores in detail
Kuhn's conception of the dynamic of normal science.

The

general purpose of this section is to highlight precisely
what is at stake in Kuhn's rejection of Popper's conjecture
& refutation approach to scientific activity.

But more

specifically, I will attempt to refute those interpretations
of Kuhn which understand him to be positing paradigms as
radically discontinuous, isolated monads, spontaneously and
arbitrarily generated, and having no standards to share
among others. 3

I will argue that Kuhn rather explicitly

makes it clear that paradigms arise in response to the
expectations, achievements, and failures of the old
paradigm.

This will be become important in chapters three

and four of the dissertation, insofar the imperative-3 Hans Blumenberg has himself interpreted Kuhn in
this way, and, in so doing, overlooked one of the most
promising areas of dialogue between them (Blumenberg
1983:465--I will provide a full citation of this passage
later in this chapter. See also Blumenberg 1987:512). The
development of this dialogue is one of the major aims of
this paper.
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affirmed by Gadamer and developed by Blumenberg--which
instructs us to make the other's position as strong as
possible is identified as being at the heart of the dynamic
which generates and underwrites scientific revolutions.
Whom is Kuhn Attacking?
The groundwork for understanding what is unique to
Kuhn's position can be prepared by examining the function
played by anomaly in paradigm evaluation.

Kuhn is

"empiricist" enough to grant that a crucial factor in
evaluating a paradigm is the existence of anomalies within
it.

For Kuhn, an anomaly is the violation of a paradigm-

induced expectation (Kuhn 1970a:52-3).

Kuhn states,

"Insecurity is generated by the persistent failure of the
puzzles of normal science to come out as they should" (68) .
Soon after, he expands on this "insecurity" by introducing
the idea of "crisis"--"When .... an anomaly comes to seem more
than just another puzzle of normal science, the transition
to crisis and to extraordinary science has begun" (82) .
Anomalies--violations of expectations--are therefore, first,
a source of insecurity, and second, may become a source of
crisis.

Kuhn is not altogether clear when this transition

is made, although it is clear that the transition can be
made for different reasons (82) .

For example, a crisis

state, he says, "is not, let us be clear, a response called
forth by any and every anomaly .... experience has repeatedly
shown that, in overwhelming proportion, these discrepancies
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disappear upon closer scrutiny" (Kuhn, 1977:202).

And

again, "few anomalies resist persistent effort for very
long" (203).

He continues, however, "it may resist, and if

it does, we may have the beginning of a 'crisis' or
'abnormal situation' affecting those in whose usual area of
research the continuing discrepancy lies" (203) .
Although Kuhn makes his point using terms that have
special significance for him, his general point is not
unique:

although it is difficult to pin down precisely when

an anomaly becomes threatening, it is clear that there is
"no fundamental theoretical innovation in natural science
whose enunciation has not been preceded by clear
recognition .... that something was the matter with the theory
then in vogue" (206) .
When an anomaly becomes more than a puzzle for normal
science, the transition to crisis has begun (1970a:82).
What happens in this transition is that a paradigm, in the
course of its articulation by means of puzzle-solving,
undergoes a proliferation of articulations in the face of
persistent anomalies, manifesting a breakdown in the
consensus over what exactly the paradigm is (83) .

This

proliferation, together with the crisis that ensues, provide
sufficient conditions for the emergence of a new paradigm
(80, 84).

However, neither the anomalies nor the crisis

will lead the scientist to actually abandon a theory "until
another one is suggested to replace it (Kuhn, 1977:211) ."
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Kuhn here reiterates claims made early in Structure that
rejection of a paradigm is always based upon more than
comparison of the paradigm with the world.

The initial

acceptance of a paradigm is always contextualized within a
competition between paradigms.

With this assertion, Kuhn

directly broaches the problem of paradigm choice.
However, Kuhn is immediately faced with a problem.

As

he states
Like the choice between competing political
institutions, that between competing paradigms
proves to be a choice between incompatible modes of
community life. Because it has that character, the
choice is not and cannot be determined merely by the
evaluative procedures characteristic of normal
science, for these depend in part upon a particular
paradigm, and that paradigm is at issue ..... The man
who premises a paradigm when arguing in its defence
can nonetheless provide a clear exhibit of what
scientific practice will be like for those who adopt
the new view of nature. That exhibit can be
immensely persuasive, often compellingly so. Yet,
whatever its force, the status of the circular
argument is only that of persuasion. It cannot be
made logically or even probabilistically for those
who refuse to step into the circle. The premises
and values shared by the two parties to a debate
over paradigms are not sufficiently extensive for
that. As in political revolutions, so in paradigm
choice--there is no standard higher than the assent
of the relevant community. {1970a:94)
If comparison to the world is a necessary but not the lone
or sufficient standard by which one judges the acceptability
of a paradigm, but requires in addition a competition
between and comparison of paradigmatic alternatives, then
some standard for judging the competition is in order--what
Kuhn here calls "evaluative procedures."

But Kuhn says that

the argument in defence of a paradigm cannot compel someone,
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on the basis of logical necessity, to accept that paradigm,
although the exhibit of what scientific practice will be
like for those who adopt the new view can often be
compellingly persuasive.

In other words, evaluative

procedures that would be sufficient to compel a "logically
necessary" choice are, at best, internal to a paradigm;
premises and values which are shared externally are
insufficient to compel such a "logical" choice between
paradigms.
The position at which Kuhn is directing his attack is
an interpretation of the history of science, according to
which scientific problems have been solved individually in a
cumulative progression, so that scientific consensus
concerning an acceptable solution has been relatively quick
in coming. 4

Kuhn acknowledges the intuition behind this

interpretation when he states that his own position raises
"the question of why, in the absence of binding criteria for
scientific choice, both the number of solved scientific
problems and the precision of individual problem solutions
should increase so markedly with the passage of time" (Kuhn,
1977:320).

But Kuhn attempts to answer this question by

first posing one of his own, and takes as his point of
4 In Kuhn's mind proponents of the idea of cumulative

progress might include someone like Popper. See, for
example, Popper's statements in The Myth of the Framework
(1994), p. 103. For a contrary view, however, see Lakatos
(1970:92). In any case, it is important to note that Kuhn
explicitly identifies the textbooks of science as perhaps
the most practically effective proponent of the view.
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departure for answering the initial question his answer to
~

question.

What ... are the characteristics of a good scientific
theory? ... First, a theory should be accurate ....
Second, a theory should be consistent .... Third, it
should have broad scope .... Fourth, it should be
simple .... Fifth, a theory should be fruitful of new
research findings .... Together with others of much
the same sort, they provide the shared basis for
theory choice. (Kuhn, 1977:321-2)
This list comprises a fairly traditional list of the
criteria used in evaluating theories, and as such provide no
real source of contention.

Kuhn, however, adds the crucial

proviso that "individually the criteria are imprecise:
individuals may legitimately differ about their application
to concrete cases (322) ."

One historical example he

provides concerns the acceptance of Copernican theory:

the

consistency criterion would have required an unequivocal
defence of the geocentric tradition.

The upshot of the

answer to the question concerning the characteristics of a
good scientific theory is that, although all scientists
might agree on the list of criteria (and even that is
doubtful, unless the list is kept very short), still the
relative weights assigned to the criteria might differ from
individual to individual, as may the application of those
criteria in concrete cases (335) .
This argument provides one element in Kuhn's answer to
the question why the number and precision of scientific
solutions increase.

But the whole explanation requires more

than reliance on the list of criteria characterizing a good
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scientific theory.
For that purpose one must go beyond the list of
shared criteria to characteristics of the
individµals who make the choice. One must, that is,
deal with characteristics which vary from one
scientist to another without thereby in the least
jeopardizing their adherence to the canons that make
science scientific. Though such canons do exist and
should be discoverable, they are not by themselves
sufficient to determine the decisions of individual
scientists. For that purpose the shared canons must
be fleshed out in ways that differ from one
individual to another (my stress).
(1977:324-5)
Since the set of criteria is itself too indeterminate and
variable to sufficiently dictate a logically compelling
choice, and therefore is no algorithm at all, one must turn
to the historical record of scientific activity to determine
how the criteria were appropriated, interpreted, and applied
in particular cases.

What is more, since the set of

criteria is insufficient, one must, in turning to history,
uncover the "individual factors" that have--together with
the criteria--determined the choice of one paradigm over
another.

Affirming this "mixture" of objective and

subjective factors is, by his own account, among the more
revolutionary features of Kuhn's redescription of the image
of science (1977:325) . 5

His reasons for saying this are

perhaps due to the protracted debate about his version of

5 Perhaps not simply most revolutionary, but as such

also most effective. Despite his own reservations about
their work, Kuhn has been a major influence upon the
sociology of science, particularly the Edinburgh School,
represented by Barnes and Bloor. Others within his scope of
influence--and yet with whom he would seriously disagree-have been Joseph Rouse and Steve Fuller, to name just a few.
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this mix.

It is possible, however, that the debate is due

more to the ambiguities in his position than to the
revolutionary features of it. 6 So, for example, Kuhn
stated in the revised version of £S.R (1970),
Nothing about that relatively familiar thesis [that
theory choice is not simply a matter of deductive
proof] implies either that there are no good reasons
for being persuaded or that those reasons are not
ultimately decisive for the group. Nor does it even
imply that the reasons for choice are different from
those usually listed by philosophers of science:
accuracy, simplicity, fruitfulness, and the like.
What it should suggest, however, is that such
reasons function as values and that they can thus be
differently applied, individually and collectively,
by men who concur in honoring them. If two men
disagree, for example, about the relative
fruitfulness of their theories, or if they agree
about that but disagree about the relative
importance of fruitfulness and, say scope in
reaching a choice, neither can be convicted of a
mistake. Nor is either being unscientific. There
is no neutral algorithm for theory-choice, no
systematic decision procedure which, properly
applied, must lead each individual in the group to
the same decision.
(1970a:199-200)
Since the time he made this statement Kuhn has been at pains
to stress that his identification of subjective factors in
theory-choice should not be understood in a way that opposes
"subjective" to "judgmental," such that the former would
mean: factors which could not be subjected to dialogue
(1977:337).

As he states, there are good reasons for a

decision, and these reasons may be no different than those
already identified by philosophers of science.

Kuhn only

6 Cf. the collection of essays gathered under the
title Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, ed. Imre
Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1970).

16
claims that these reasons, or criteria, must not be
understood to function as "rules" which can be
algorithmically applied in the self-same way.

Their

application, therefore, does not "prove" the judgment or
choice being made.

Rather, these criteria are values which

can only "influence" the choice of one paradigm over another
(331) .

They are ways of establishing and distributing

burdens of proof.

As values, their application may be

ambiguous, but not without reason, and certainly not on that
account arbitrary or irrational (Kuhn 1970b:262).
One might wonder here precisely how far Kuhn intends
to depart from f allibilist understandings of scientific
method.

Kuhn is not clear about whom he has in mind when he

speaks of a neutral algorithm that is logically compelling.
If Kuhn is disparaging only those for whom a scientific
method could be infallibly applied, then this criticism
leaves Popper, Lakatos, Quine,

(etc.) unscathed. 7

For

example, Kuhn's antagonists are precisely IlQt. the thinkers
just mentioned when he states the following:
Before the group accepts it, a new theory has been
tested over time by the research of a number of men,
some working within it, others within its
traditional rival. Such a mode of development,
however, requires a decision process which permits
rational men to disagree, and such disagreement
7 Once again, Popper explicitly denies that he is an

infallibilist (Popper 1974:28). Perhaps equally important
is a point I will develop in the next chapter: For Popper
there is room for debate in science--its activities do not
simply consist of conjectures and the testing of
conjectures.
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would be barred by the shared algorithm which
philosophers have generally sought. If it were at
hand, all conforming scientists would make the same
decision at the same time. With standards for
acceptance set too low, they would move from one
attractive global viewpoint to another, never giving
traditional theory an opportunity to supply
equivalent attractions. With standards set higher,
no one satisfying the criterion of rationality would
be inclined to try out the new theory, to articulate
it in ways which showed its fruitfulness or
displayed its accuracy and scope .... What from one
viewpoint may seem the looseness and imperfection of
choice criteria conceived as rules may, when the
same criteria are seen as values, appear as
indispensable means of spreading the risk which the
introduction of support of novelty always entails.
(1977:322)

By means of this 'defense' Kuhn claims that his position
concerning the status of these criteria as values, far from
leading to the disintegration of the scientific enterprise,
actually guarantees the viability of scientific activity.
Given that new theories have generally been accepted only
after considerable lengths of time and testing, Kuhn argues
that this state of affairs should not be cause for concern.
Kuhn in fact is arguing for an understanding of the
decision-making procedures of science which does justice to
the history of scientific activity--that is, one which does
not turn the majority of our scientific ancestors into less
rational creatures than we claim ourselves to be.

There is

no need to presuppose the existence of a neutral, permanent
and objective algorithm for paradigm choice in order to make
scientific activity appear rational.

In fact, its

imposition would actually make the vast majority of cases in
the history of scientific achievement appear irrational.
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Were we to impose more stringent standards upon scientific
activity, then no scientific novelty could have survived the
test of such standards, since no scientific novelty has ever
unambiguously met every criteria irrunediately.

Similarly,

Kuhn argues that the standards could not be set too low-which is certainly one of the objections critics raise
against his own position--since that would permit a constant
proliferation of theories between which one could not, in a
non-arbitrary way, choose.

In short, Kuhn is aiming for a

middle ground, in which judgment, as the application of
shared values, is primary. 8
This middle ground, however, is occupied by a number
of thinkers.

When Kuhn describes the adherents of an

algorithm as being those for whom no rational disagreement
is possible, and for whom every scientific decision would
have to be made at the same time, then he would find no such
adherents among the thinkers listed above.

Kuhn, does

believe he is attacking Popper, insofar as he appears to
believe that the following can fairly be attributed to
Popper:
a) Popper is, or can be treated as, a naive
8 I will take up this issue not only in the following
section, but also at some length in the third chapter. At
that point we will see that Richard J. Bernstein has drawn
some interesting parallels between Kuhn's understanding of
judgment and the Aristotelian understanding of phronesis.
This parallel itself, furthermore, introduces the
contribution of Gadamer to the discussion. The upshot of
the parallels will be a better understanding of the role of
tradition {and dogmatism) in scientific activity.
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falsificationist (Kuhn, 1970b:14);
b) Popper believes that a falsified theory is not or
cannot be used in scientific practice or in the search for a
new theory (Kuhn, 1980:191); or,
c) Popper believes that scientists do or must act as
though they were in a state of nature or epistemically
original position (Callebaut, 1993:301).
I will argue in the next chapter that none of these
positions can, in fact, be attributed to Popper.
Objections to Kuhn: Larry Laudan
Consideration of Laudan's critique in this section
foreshadows the analysis that will take place in Chapter
Three, under the heading, "The Dispute Over Values."
Laudan's main criticism is that Kuhn's position underwrites
revolution as the breakdown of consensus, without explaining
either how such consensus can be re-established or how the
revolution can be understood as progressive.

In Chapter

Three we will see John Caputo make a similar point--though
he does not by these means denigrate Kuhn, but rather links
him to Derrida.

On this reading, revolution is the

perpetual dissolution of normal science into a state of
anarchy, for which state shared values are ineffective in
arbitrating judgments between theories.

I will argue there

that this completely overlooks two of the more obvious
claims made by Kuhn:

that values are not ineffective during

revolutions, and that dogmatism and revolution must be seen

20

in their complementarity, not as isolatable episodes.
Kuhn's worry with Caputo's understanding of scientific
revolution, I will suggest, is the same worry Laudan
expresses with respect to Kuhn:

this understanding of

revolution only underscores the impotence of revolutions-their perpetual and mutual cancellation--rather than their
power.

The potency of any revolution lies in its ability to

recover the "middle ground," where, as I said above,
judgment is primary.
The position that Kuhn carves out in this middle
ground as being characteristic of scientific activity is
attacked by Larry Laudan, who attempts to uncover the
relativistic and incoherent aspects of Kuhn's position.

In

this regard he focuses on the following statements made by
Kuhn:
Lifelong resistance [to a new theory] ... is not a
violation of scientific standards .... Though the
historian can always find men--Priestly, for
instance-- who were unreasonable to resist for as
long as they did, he will not find a point at which
resistance becomes illogical or unscientific
(1970a:159).
And similarly,
The transfer of allegiance from paradigm to paradigm
is a conversion experience that cannot be forced.
Lifelong resistance, particularly from those whose
productive careers have cormnitted them to an older
tradition of normal science, is not a violation of
scientific standards but an index to the nature of
scientific research itself (151) .
As far as Laudan is concerned, statements like the
above smack of sheer relativism.

When combined with Kuhn's
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attempt to characterize the criteria for paradigm choice as
values rather than rules, these statements actually
undermine Kuhn's attempt to view history as a resource for
understanding the nature of scientific activity.

Despite

the fact that Kuhn argues for a place for "objective"
criteria for theory-choice, Laudan argues, he too strongly
delimits the sufficiency of their applicability.
Consequently, he is left without a recourse--other than the
dubious metaphor of "conversion"--to explain exactly how in
the histo:ry of science so much consensus has come about
(Laudan 1984:17-8).

Kuhn's theory, in other words, may help

to explain why disagreement breaks out among scientists, and
even why such disagreement lasts as long as it does, but his
theory provides no "mechanism" for consensus formation.
Consensus, on this view, has been one of the most
distinctive features of scientific activity.

Accounting for

consensus was actually one of the motivating reasons behind
Kuhn's introduction of the concept of "paradigm":

he does

provide a picture of science as a consensual activity, which
is one of the things he means by "normal science."

But what

he does not provide, Laudan claims, is a plausible account
of the dynamic process by which the crisis state of
scientific activity is transformed into the consensual state
of normal science.

The reason he cannot provide such a

picture is because he has, by insisting on the
inconunensurability of standards governing the choice of
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paradigms, removed any cormnon rational foundation on which
to shape consensus anew (Laudan, 1984:18) . 9
As an instance of this, Laudan points to Kuhn's
position that different paradigms deal with different
problems.

In attempting to come to grips with the fact that

in the history of science there has been explanatory loss as
well as explanatory gain, Kuhn works himself into a position
in which consensus cannot be explained (Kuhn, 1977:211).
Kuhn states,
To the extent, as significant as it is incomplete,
that two scientific schools disagree about what is a
problem and what a solution, they will inevitably
talk through each other when debating the relative
merits of their respective paradigms. In the
partially circular arguments that regularly result,
each paradigm will be shown to satisfy more or less
the criteria it dictates for itself and to fall
short of a few of those dictated by its
opponent ..... Since no paradigm ever solves all the
problems it defines and since no two paradigms leave
all the same problems unsolved, paradigm debates
always involve the question: Which problems is it
more significant to have solved? Like the issue of
competing standards, that question of values can be
answered only in terms of criteria that lie outside
of normal science altogether, and it is that
recourse to external criteria that most obviously
makes paradigm debates revolutionary (Kuhn, 1970a:
109-110).
According to Laudan, this position is rather extreme.

Kuhn

rejects the idea that science is progressive in the sense of

9 The incormnensurability debate sustains a now
voluminous primary and secondary literature. Among the
leading voices in the debate are Davidson (1985), Putnam
(1981), Feyerabend (1987), and Rorty (1979). Of central
importance to my own understanding of this debate and its
relationship to the figures and issues treated in this paper
are Ingram (1993a, 1993b, 1995) .
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being cumulative.

But in doing so he simultaneously

denigrates progress into something that can at best only be
instrumental. 10 He fails to see that there is the
possibility of deploying the concept of progress in such a
way that it avoids, on one extreme, the assumption that it
be cumulative, and on the other extreme, that it be only
instrumental.
Laudan believes there is a way between these two
extremes.

He says

Knowledge of the relative weight or the relative
number or problems can allow us to specify those
circumstances under which the growth of knowledge
can be progressive even when we lose the capacity to
solve certain problems. (Laudan 1977:150)
Laudan calls his position a "problem-solving approach" to
scientific activity.

Contrary to Kuhn, Laudan believes that

one can "weigh" problems to determine their significance.
One of the most important means to weigh problems is, in
fact, to categorize much more explicitly than Kuhn has done
the various "kinds" of anomaly that confront any scientific
theory.

Kuhn, it has been shown, is very general in his

analysis of anomaly, and is particularly imprecise when it
comes to determining when exactly an anomaly is or becomes a
source of crisis.

In contrast, Laudan seeks to be

considerably more specific.

Laudan's aim is a "calculus" to

lO By "instrumental" I believe Laudan intends the
pejorative sense according to which science would merely
produce better means, or instruments, for independently
determined ends.
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determine the significance of scientific problems.

At

times, this calculus is stated very generally, such as when
he says
The overall problem-solving effectiveness of a
theory is determined by assessing the number and
importance of the empirical problems which the
theory solves and deducting therefrom the number and
importance of the anomalies and conceptual problems
which the theory generates (Laudan, 1977:68).
At other times, Laudan makes very specific proposals for a
calculus (33ff .) .

In any case, his essential plea is that

it must be possible, if we are to affirm the rationality of
theory-choice, "to indicate at least the differences between
those anomalies which are disastrous for a theory and those
which are only a mild embarrassment" (37).
Does such a calculus hold any promise?

On the one

hand one can say that such a calculus would face problems
similar to those faced by the utilitarian project of a
calculus for moral decision-making. 11

Kuhn in fact might

object that Laudan is assuming much more commensurability
between theories than is warranted.

Would the calculus be a

neutral instrument for weighing the significance of problems
across paradigms, or would each paradigm first determine the
significance of its own problems?

That is, do we compare

paradigms only after we have first--in abstraction from the
paradigms themselves--"individually" weighed the problems
within them, or do we compare paradigms after each paradigm
11 Cf. Steve Fuller, Social Epistemology
(Bloomington: University of Indiana, 1988), 103.
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has derived the "sum total" of it..s. problem-solving
effectiveness by it..s. own criteria? 12
Summary
The point of this section was that there does seem to
be some prima facie warrant for the idea that the relative
significance of problems must be determined.
this point Kuhn himself would agree.

Of course on

Laudan's project of

establishing a calculus is highly questionable, however,
particularly in light of the problems such projects have
experienced in the past.

The determination of relative

significance is better accounted for, Kuhn argues, by the
dynamic of normal science.
The Dynamic of Normal Science
The implicit context for the kind of scientific
activity that has been discussed thus far has been what
Popper calls "revolutions in permanence," the ideal of which
is that scientists engage in "perpetual framework-breaking"
12 This apparently naive question is of some

importance, for in either case it would be difficult to
adjudicate the weighing of a problem in a situation such as
the following: when comparing one-on-one the solutions
offered to a problem by two competing paradigms, one
determines that solution A provided by paradigm 1 (Pl) is
"better"--because more accurate--than solution B provided by
paradigm 2 (P2). Yet, the importance of solution B in P2
has significant implications for the acceptance of solutions
within a completely different paradigm P3. How would one,
in this example, go about making a determination of the
weight of the problem to which these two opposing solutions
were solutions? This question captures Kuhn's point about
determining the relative value of different criteria such
as, in this case, accuracy and scope.
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(Popper, 1970:242).

According to Popper, Kuhn suggests,

"the scientist should try at all times to be a critic and a
proliferator of alternate theories" (Kuhn, 1970b:243) . 13
On Kuhn's reading of Popper, proliferation can take place
without falling prey to paralysis because of the efficacy of
the principle of falsification.

Significant variation and

difference must be permitted--bold conjecture must be the
defining mark of the serious scientist.
Kuhn's own idea of crisis differs significantly from
this state of affairs.

If one were to search for the

operative standards that determine the significance of
problems, then one would not conduct that search within a
context like the one thus far characterized as a crisisstate.

In other words, one does not first determine what

the significant problems and standards are in the state of
crisis.

In the crisis state, preliminary determinations of

such signf icance have already been made through the
processes and products of normal science.

This is why Kuhn

is not satisfied with the characterization of crisis
provided.

It is also why he would not agree to Laudan's

"calculus" for determining problem-significance.

Such

determinations for Kuhn are not made in abstraction from the
context of crisis nor

~

after the crisis has arisen.

For

l3 But as we shall see in detail in the next chapter,
allows for a considerable amount of dogmatism in
inquiry. His recognition of the need for such dogmatism is
a primary point in his rejection of the criticism that he is
a naive falsificationist.
~opper
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that matter, in an assertion Kuhn aims directly at Lakatos,
such determinations not made only after a research prograrmne
is in decline, in a period of stagnation, or has ceased to
produce novelty (Kuhn 1980: 190-1) . 14
Therefore, for Kuhn, in order to understand the
context of crisis--and the problems and standards operative
within it--one must understand the dynamic of normal
science.

The dynamic of normal science, according to Kuhn,

provides the "special occasions" when the scientist should
adopt a "revolutionary" attitude.

In other words, the

scientist should not engage in constant framework-breaking,
but should do so only when the time is right--when a special
occasion presents itself . 15
The distinction and interaction between normal science
and the context of crisis, suggested by Kuhn, is intended to

14

I will develop the implications of this claim at
the end of this chapter.
15 The interpretation of Kuhn which pictures one

period of normal science "breaking off" and being supplanted
by a period of crisis, which in turn breaks off and is
supplanted by a new period of normal science, etc., fails to
recognize that for Kuhn normal science and the crisis-state
can only be distinguished within the context of a general
dynamic of scientific activity. Normal science and the
crisis-state are not self-enclosed 'periods' successive upon
one another; rather, they are better described as 'ways' of
doing science, the description of which is not reaucible to
a relationship of temporal succession upon one another.
Some temporal succession is identifiable, but only against
the background of an integrating dynamic. Rouse makes this
observation in drawing his own comparison of Kuhn with
Heidegger. According to him, these 'ways' of doing science
are "moods" or "dispositions," in a Heideggerian sense, of
the scientific cormnunity (Rouse 1981, 277-8) .
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undermine a conception of crisis which makes of it the
privileged characteristic of science.

Furthermore, it

elevates the dogmatic element beyond what someone like
Popper permits.

Kuhn describes his insistence on this

dogmatic element as being "strategic."
Kuhn's kind of dogmatism as dangerous . 16

Popper describes
On the other side

of this rhetoric, significant differences become manifest.
For Kuhn, when a theory that satisfies the
requirements for being a good theory is made available, "the
time for steady criticism and theory proliferation has
passed" (Kuhn 1970b:246).

Scientists could continue to

proliferate theories and question fundamentals, but they
typically do not.

There are two reasons for this,

representing positive and negative aspects of the dynamic of
normal science.

First, if scientists commit themselves to a

theory, they gain the opportunity to "explore nature to an
esoteric depth and detail otherwise unimaginable" (Kuhn
1970b:247).

Second, they can indulge their 'dogmatism' in

the confidence that it will actually function ultimately to
reveal the weaknesses in the theory and thereby set the
stage for future revolution.
Of course this preliminary description of normal
science raises the question not simply of what allows the

16 Note that the title of his critical response to

Kuhn, "Normal Science and Its Dangers" (Popper 1970), is
obviously intended to echo his famous book, The ()_pen Society
and Its Enemies.
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scientist to stop questioning fundamentals and stop
proliferating theories, but more importantly what rationally
motivates the scientist to do so?

Kuhn admits that

scientists could try to engage in such activities, but that
they could not engage in them constantly or permanently
(Kuhn 1970b:242-3).

Of course, many philosophers of science

would agree with this. 17

The question is: where does one

go from that point?
In one sense, that scientists do not engage in
constant proliferation is, for Kuhn, an individ.ual decision
based upon the freedom the scientist enjoys; in another
sense, that scientists do not engage in such activities in
the face of an available theory is a characteristic
temperament of scientists reflective of community structure
and its patterns of education.

Neither of these senses,

however, justifies the claim that they should not engage in
"revolutions in permanence."
The motivations Kuhn uncovers are primarily
psychological and sociological--for example, he points to
various dispositions towards "risk-taking."

These

dispositions are molded through a community pattern of
education that also determines the range of standards of
tolerance.

17

What are the reasons behind the determination of

This issue will be discussed more fully in the
next chapter. Once again, the degree of difference between
Kuhn and someone like Popper is not as wide as is sometimes
suggested.

30

this range?

The question arises whether epistemic

motivations on the part of an individual scientist are
actually legislated by the community--which may be fine and
good.

But is this legislation itself epistemically

motivated?

For example, community self-preservation and

maintenance of professional identity are important values,
but are they the fundamental standards legislating
scientific research?

When Kuhn speaks of the "ideological"

nature of being alert to anomaly, one can justifiably
suspect that he is more in sympathy with the Edinburgh
school of the sociology of science than he would care to
admit (Kuhn, 1970b:248).

Is he in fact sliding down the

slippery slope?
Furthermore, because Kuhn restricts the efficacy of
testability in practice (e.g. falsifiability), particularly
during those crisis states when theories are proliferating,
his understanding of scientific activity threatens to
undermine its rationality.

Kuhn tries to mitigate this

threat by disclosing the conditions necessary for a rational
application of this principle.

Unfortunately, the

conditions disclosed seem to be too ideological to allow one
to assign a rational motivation to such applications.
For example, Kuhn speaks of a "considerable resistance
to paradigm change" within the practice of normal science,
due to the fact that such practice has become "increasingly
rigid."

Resistors and innovators will "inevitably talk
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through each other," so that a change in belief or
commitment to a new paradigm is best described as a
"conversion experience" or a "gestalt switch."
Many questions plague Kuhn's position here.

If the

dogmatism of normal science functions to reveal its own
weaknesses, then the question is:
weaknesses revealed?
dogmatism?

to whom are such

Does an individual scientist escape

If so, how?

Does one ultimately escape

dogmatism only by never having been dogmatic oneself?

Kuhn

comes off sounding this way when he speaks of paradigm
change as taking place when one generation dies off and
another takes its place.

In this sense, then, scientists

never do escape their dogmatism, though the next generation
may (though they themselves would be fated for their own
dogmas) .

But then science would seem to change only

because of dysfunctions in the educational patterns (or
indoctrination methods) of its community.

This is the

danger Popper sees in the idea of normal science:

the

devaluation of criticism in favor of (dysfunctional)
educational systems.
Kuhn does provide more 'objective' reasons for taking
anomaly seriously.
In science .... novelty emerges only with difficulty,
manifested by resistance, against a background
provided by expectation. Initially, only the
anticipated and the usual are experienced even under
circumstances where anomaly is later to be observed.
Further acquaintance, however, does result in
awareness of something wrong or does relate the
effect to something that has gone wrong before.
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That awareness of anomaly opens a period in which
conceptual categories are adjusted until the
initially anomalous has become the
anticipated ..... Let me now point out that,
recognizing the process, we can at last begin to see
why normal science, a pursuit not directed to
novelties and tending at first to suppress them,
should nevertheless be so effective in causing them
to arise.
(Kuhn, 1970a:64)
In other words, the dynamic of normal science itself, by
which a paradigm is extended in its applications, leads to
the emergence and recognition of novelty.

Such novelty

first "emerges" as anomaly, which gets transformed by the
process from the unexpected to the anticipated.

Kuhn says

that the scientific community struggles to make the anomaly
"law-like" (Kuhn, 1977:174).

He states

Without the special apparatus that is constructed
mainly for anticipated functions, the results that
lead ultimately to novelty could not occur. And
even when the apparatus exists, novelty ordinarily
emerges only for the man who, knowing with precision
what he should expect, is able to recognize that
something has gone wrong. Anomaly appears only
against the background provided by the paradigm.
The more precise and far-reaching that paradigm is,
the more sensitive an indicator it provides of
anomaly and hence of an occasion for paradigm
change.
(Kuhn, 1970a:65) (my stress)
It is one thing, of course, to identify an anomaly.
It is another thing to determine its significance.
status of anomaly remains ambiguous:

The

its existence alone

does not necessarily warrant a crisis--there is no clear way
of determining when an anomaly should be taken seriously,
when it should be overlooked, when it may in fact eventually
be solved within the framework of the existing paradigm, how
much time should be permitted to allow for the emergence of
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such a solution, etc.

Anomaly, then, does not always

provide an occasion for paradigm change.
say is that it

~

The most one can

provide such an occasion.

Anomaly alone does not logically compel one to abandon
a particular hypothesis, since there is no way of
determining where exactly in the network of assumptions and
hypotheses the problem exists which led one to make an
incorrect prediction; additionally, there is no way of
determining whether the problem rests with the hypothesis or
with the assumptions underlying the hypothesis.

Given an

anomaly, therefore, one has no reason to abandon any
particular hypothesis or, in Kuhn's case, paradigm.

The

upshot of the argument, then, is that neither anomaly alone
can undermine commitment to a particular paradigm, nor
should the solution to anomaly by another paradigm
necessarily lead one to adopt it.

Anomaly can, therefore,

up to this point, serve as a point of connection between
disparate paradigms, and may even provide the occasion for
the emergence of a new paradigm, but it is not, either as
solved or unsolved, sufficient to warrant a choice between
paradigms.
Kuhn's position here is actually no different from
that of other philosophers of science.

For example,

Popper's view would be that commitment to an old theory
('dogmatism') can be rationally motivated by the promise of
potential epistemic gain.

Rational motivation ends when one
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def ends an old theory on the basis of increasingly ad hoc
additions and conditions.

Likewise, bold conjecture is

rationally motivated by similar considerations of epistemic
gain.
For Popper, the requirements that must be satisfied by
a scientist's expectations for epistemic gain are
considerably less rigid than they are for Kuhn.

Popper

grants considerably more freedom to the scientist to make
conjectures at any time.

At least one reason for this is

that any conjecture must be tested, and this testing is the
final arbiter of a claim to any epistemic gain.

For Kuhn,

rational motivation is ultimately subject to a rigor of
expectations issuing from the current practice of normal
science. 18

It is not so much that the freedom Popper

grants to the scientist is necessarily impermissible, but
more that it is neither an efficient way for science to
achieve its aims, nor the way that scientists typically do
go about their activities.

Once again, Kuhn differs on

18 Later we will see Blumenberg make a similar point
regarding historiography:
That what is new in history cannot be arbitrary in
each case, but rather is subject to a rigor of
expectations and needs, is the condition of our
being able to have such a thing as 'cognition'
[Erkenntnis] of history at all. (Blumenberg
1983:466)
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"strategic" grounds . 19
The differences between Kuhn and Popper on the
function of conjecture are traceable, I suggest, to
differences in their attitudes about underdetermination.
The problem posed by underdetermination has two sides: a
retrospective and a prospective side.

The retrospective

side of underdetermination raises the question concerning
the justification of theories already available.

The

prospective side raises the question of what direction one
can take in the future given retrospective underdetermination.

The retrospective side of underdetermination,

taken alone, would seem to paralyze scientific activity.
What sufficient reason could there be for a scientist to
move forward with her work?
Insofar as Popper is a firm believer in falsifiability, he believes that conjecture does not simply arise
out of spontaneity, but is related to the falsification of a
theory.

Conjecture arises in response to where the shoe

pinches, i.e., to specific problems in present theory
l9 This is not to suggest that it is simply for
strategic grounds, although Kuhn himself uses this language
(1970b:243). Kuhn's Wittgensteinian-inspired approach to
these issues differs in significant ways from Popper's more
Kantian approach. Furthermore, Popper's imperative (which
Kuhn calls both "ideological" [1970b:243] and "moral"
[1970c:22]) to engage in revolutions in permanence (to
ruthlessly conjecture) stands in remarkable contrast to, as
we shall see, Kuhn's own more Aristotelian-inspired
deference to the authority of the (scientific) community.
This issue, particularly Popper's own understanding of the
relationship of the autonomous conjecturer/critic to the
community will be explored in the next chapter.
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(Popper, 1989:129)

Now, in the dispute with Kuhn, Popper

seems to say something quite different.

In challenging

Kuhn's talk about crises, Popper holds up the example of
Einstein as one who did not make his conjectures in the
context of a crisis.

In fact, Einstein's conjectures were

responses to assynunetries that no one else saw either as
endangering current theory or as needing extermination.
assynunetries were merely "ugly."

The

Now as strong an objection

as this may be to Kuhn, it is also at least moderately
problematic for Popper as well.

For Popper, there is no

reason why one scientist engages in bold conjecture in a
context where no one else sees a problem, and why another
scientist is more clearly problem-driven.

There is nothing

"reasonable" about the activity of making bold conjectures-it is simply a tradition of myth-making.

One may question

whether the motivation for epistemic gain might drive the
conjectural act, but in this example the only motivation
indicated is the aesthetic value of removing ugliness.

I am

not accusing Popper of blatant inconsistency or incoherence,
but am simply trying to point out the level of
sophistication at which the distinction between Kuhn and
Popper becomes ascertainable.

In the Einstein case, it

appears that Popper grants considerable ground to the thesis
that theory-change is primarily theory-driven.

Of course

Popper might respond that, not change, but only conjecture
is theory driven.
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Kuhn approaches the question of undetermination by
asserting that puzzle-solving is the measure of scientific
achievement.

Specifically, Kuhn holds up the standard of

exemplary problem solutions as the models by which future
research can proceed.

Undetermination means that a theory

always says more than is warranted by nature.

The theory is

permitted this excess and will survive as long as it remains
compatible with nature.

In other words, a theory can always

say "more" than nature warrants and still be considered a
"fit" with nature as long as what is says is compatible with
nature.
The preceding recognizes that for Kuhn knowledge is
not secured inductively, from the ground up, by piecemeal
accumulation of observations.

Instead, the search for

knowledge begins with conjecture--"imaginative posits,
invented in one piece for application to nature" (Kuhn
1970c:10).

The procedure of this search involves the

"specification" or "articulation" of the theory by means of
the application of exemplary problem solutions to gaps
within the theory.

These applications are what Kuhn calls

puzzle-solving, and it is the dominant feature of normal
science, by which scientists "explore nature to an esoteric
depth and detail otherwise unimaginable."
It is important to realize that for Kuhn this process of
application incorporates testing at a 'latent' level.

In

other words, puzzle-solving does involve testing, but only--
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as Popper might put it--as a second-order tradition.

The

primary impetus in puzzle-solving is to fill in the gaps.
This race to apply the exemplars to numerous puzzles may
seem to be just another case of trying to be successful
without being sure whether your success is due to knowledge
or chance.

In other words, it may seem to be a case of

extension by means of the path of least resistance.

In such

a case, the excess claims our theory makes may be compatible
with nature insofar as they are not expressly refuted.

But

such excesses could not claim to be knowledge, insofar as
many constructions of the imagination could be posited that
could not be falsified.
Kuhn is not advocating this kind of path of least
resistance.

Instead, recognizing that the value of Popper's

falsifiability principle (or, as Kuhn prefers to call it,
the assymmetry principle) is its elevation of "resistance"
into the surest marker of knowledge that we have, Kuhn is
suggesting that the puzzle-solving path is the means to
uncovering the most--and the most troublesome--resistance.
Kuhn's point is simply that anomalies may occur at many
points at many times, but no one believes that the mere
existence of an anomaly refutes a theory.

Furthermore, no

one believes that the appearance of an anomaly even
represents an immediate challenge to a theory.

At best, one

might say that it represents a potential challenge.

But a

scientist generally blames himself or other factors many
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times over before he turns on the theory.

Ultimately,

though, the scientist may turn on the theory.
However, even when the scientist turns on the theory,
the rules, problems, and puzzle-solutions which have guided
that theory continue to operate as standards of achievement,
establishing burdens of proof against which competitor
paradigms must measure up.

In this way, the old paradigm

functions in the process of discovering a likely successor.
It does this by establishing the standards and problems to
which the successor must be a response.

Kuhn states it in

the following way.
Competing research progrannnes need not in principle
display differences in fruitfulness. Whether or not
they do, furthermore, at least one other criterion
must be considered when choosing between them. A
pref erred progrannne is expected not only to produce
new achievements but also to conserve the
achievements of the progranune it replaces. In that
situation, the successes and failures of each
progrannne provide the standards against which the
other must be evaluated. Appraisal then becomes
intrinsically relative, involving both progrannnes as
well as nature from the start. (Kuhn, 1980:190)
On the following page, Kuhn continues the same line of
argument as follows:
Whatever its difficulties, Sir Karl's [Popper]
emphasis on falsification captured an aspect of
scientific life that [Lakatos's] methodology of
research progrannnes effectively ignores. A
scientific theory embodies expectations about
natural phenomena; those expectations can be
disappointed; and, when they are, some scientists
usually start to look for an alternate theory. In
ignoring this function of severe anomaly, Lakatos's
position has, I think, moved too far from Sir
Karl's. But in a closely related respect it remains
too close. Once a theory has been falsified (Sir
Karl) or entered a degenerating phase (Lakatos), it
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may be displaced by another theory. According to
both these viewpoints, however, the existence of a
potential replacement theory appears pure
coincidence. Neither falsificationism nor Lakatos's
methodology suggests how closely successive theories
or research programmes relate to each other: the
successor is usually conceived in response to, and
is often also shaped by, particular difficulties
encountered in the development of its predecessor.
(191)
For Kuhn, science proceeds by means of a logic of
provocation and response, such that paradigm choice takes
place within a context by which the adoption of one paradigm
is simultaneously the displacement of another. 20

But this

20 We can now see how Blumenberg' s criticism, to
which I referred at the outset of this chapter, misses the
mark. Blumenberg's comments can now be appreciated in full:

The theory of 'scientific revoltions' describes, for
the most part correctly, the breakdown of dominant
systems as a result of their immanent rigorism, the
'pedantic' disposition of every schoollike mode of
thought, which leads with fateful inevitability to
the self-uncovering of the marginal inconsistencies
from which doubt and opposition break into the
field. This conception of what historians have been
pleased to call "downfalls" may be capable of
generalization to a high level in relation to
historical phenomena. But in relation to the new
foundations called for afterward, to the preference
given to the new "paradigm," this schema has no
explanation whatever to offer. (Blumenberg 1983:
465)

Blumenberg goes on immediately to classify Kuhn's theory as
fostering a "decisionist" approach to theory replacement.
Whatever more serious oversights may have led to this
particular interpretation, Paul Hoyningen-Huene has offered
one possible source for the "decisionist" reproach:
In the German-speaking world, the apparently quasireligious character of scientific revolutions became
almost unavoidable with the translation of
"conversion," or "to convert" by "Bekehrung" and
"bekehren," respectively.
(Hoyningen-Huene
1993:258)
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choice is not simply according to f alsif icationist
standards, but also according to the concrete standards
imposed by each paradigm.

Other commentators (i.e., in

addition to Blumenberg) have missed the functional role Kuhn
assigns to the previous paradigm both in provoking the
emergence of a new paradigm, and in setting specific
standards for what can qualify as a new paradigm.

We will

see in chapter three that John Caputo misses, or perhaps
disregards, the functional role played by a previous
paradigm.
The new paradigm, then, must satisfy the majority of
the needs previously satisfied.

The advantage to this

procedure is that if a paradigm is simply abandoned at the
first instance of anomaly, on the basis of a particular
application of standards of testing, then, as Popper himself
admits, the real power of the paradigm may never be
discovered.

The power of a paradigm is two-fold:

its

unfolding of the knowledge it may achieve, and its ability
to eventually uncover those problems the solution to which
will lead to significant advance.

If a paradigm is

abandoned before these problems are articulated, then
science may proceed not only at a slower pace, but at a
greater cost.

Once this misunderstanding is cleared up, it becomes easier
to see the parallels between Kuhn's claims and Blumenberg•s
own provocation/response schema, which I will discuss in
chapter four.
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Summary
The treatment of Kuhn's philosophy of science presented
in this chapter corrects certain misconceptions of his
position, and prepares the way for a clearer statement of
the complementarity of dogmatism and revolution.
Ultimately, for Kuhn--and as we shall see, ultimately, for
Blumenberg--the affirmation of progress requires an
affirmation of complementarity between revolutionary breaks
and tradition continuity.
Kuhn wants to affirm both dogmatic and revolutionary
aspects of scientific inquiry.

This is a difficult mix.

How can dogmatism open itself to the kind of revolutionary
critique which claims to comprise science's most dramatic
advances?

And yet, how can revolutionary critique measure

the success it claims, if not against a frame of reference
which can bridge the gap opened by the revolutionary break,
and thereby of fer points of comparison?
As we have seen throughout this chapter, the dogmatic
side of science--normal science--is not inert.

Its offer of

stability incorporates its own distinctive dynamic.

Normal

science is not, therefore, the positing of a stable mass
which then gets eroded by means of a constant barrage of
criticism.

It is not simply a target for criticism.

Nor,

finally, is it a passive system which avoids conflict.
A central part of Kuhn's contribution is to highlight what
is involved in the search for conflict.

An important part
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of that search is internal.

As we shall see in the next

chapter, conflict for Popper fosters the kind of competition
within which the competencies and achievements of a theory
(or lack thereof) can be revealed.

Kuhn also appreciates

the possibilities inherent in conflict, but is less sanguine
than Popper about the prospects for a revolutionary conflict
that is undertaken perpetually, or at any time.

We will see

in the next chapter that Popper himself, despite his loyalty
to the credo "revolutions in permanence," does not dispense
with a role for dogmatism.

His own mix, however, may be no

more satisfying than is Kuhn's.

CHAPTER THREE
POPPER:

BETWEEN DOGMATISM AND ENTHUSIASM

Insofar as Popper also recognizes the dogmatism that
Kuhn has identified, he too must affirm some mix or
complementarity between dogmatism and criticism in inquiry.
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the kind of
mix Popper offers.
Popper interprets the role of dogmatism in inquiry as
helping to establish "where the real power of our theories
lies" (Popper 1970:55).

Although it would be too simple to

say (as a kind of summary of the first chapter) that for
Kuhn such a determination is only made from within the
paradigm itself, by means of a purely internal dynamic,
still the determination of its power is not achieved only by
an external critique either--as Popper seems to suggest with
his idea of "revolutions in permanence."
The importance of establishing the power of our
theories, for Popper, lies in the contribution it makes to
an assessment of the progress achieved through revolutionary
theory change.

Popper does not assess progress simply by

measuring competing theories against nature; rather, an
assessment of progress requires theory comparison.

It is

crucial, then, to be able to determine exactly what the
44
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competing theories are.

Popper states that a newly-accepted

theory must always be able to explain fully the achievements
of its predecessor (Popper 1994:12).
explain what the old theory had been.

It must be able to
By the end of this

chapter, we will be in a position to understand why Popper's
thesis of permanent revolution--or perpetual framework
breaking--risks failing to satisfy this very requirement:
can revolutionary critique alone, as Popper understands it,
make this determination?

If we approach Popper's statements concerning dogmatism
only from the perspective of a strong version of the
doctrine of falsifiability, then we might feel, as Kuhn
evidently does, that these statements are concessions that
threaten the integrity of Popper's position.

If, however,

we approach Popper's overall position keeping these
concessions in view from the start, then we see that
Popper's position takes on a subtlety that perhaps Kuhn has
not adequately considered.

This subtlety reveals

considerably more overlap between Kuhn's and Popper's
position than is normally recognized, and so makes the
resulting differences between them more significant.

In

this section I will explore Popper position on dogmatism.
In the next section I will explore his position on the
severity of criticism, and the corresponding boldness of
conjectures.
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The Legitimacy of Dogmatism in Inquiry
Popper often gives the impression that he is an
unequivocal opponent of dogmatism.

He often lumps

dogmatism, ideology, intolerance, and intellectual fashions
together.

In so describing these terms he opposes them to

"criticism," which is at the heart of rationality and the
growth of knowledge.

He states, "I hold that orthodoxy is

the death of knowledge, since the growth of knowledge
depends entirely on the existence of disagreement" (Popper,
1994:34).

Most failures to advance knowledge are due to

such orthodoxy. Popper therefore calls himself an "almost
orthodox adherent of unorthodoxy" (34) .
Throughout his discussions of such issues, however, he also
makes careful distinctions which indicate both that his
position is more subtle than a mere surface reading would
capture, and that he senses a certain tension within the
distinction between dogmatism and criticism.
Popper's first 'concession' is an explicit one:
am an admirer of tradition" (34).
strong supporter of tradition.

" ... I

Popper, in fact, is a

He mentions this as one of

the points of overlap between Kuhn and himself that Kuhn
seems to have missed (Schilpp, 1974:1195, n201).

He not

only wrote an article entitled, "Towards a Rational Theory
of Tradition," but also refers to the "critical tradition"
that the earliest Greek philosophers introduced (Popper,
1989:126, 149; 1994:42).
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But Popper not only acknowledges an appreciation for
tradition, he correspondingly modifies his conception of
dogmatism.

He states that "there is even something like a

methodological justification for individual scientists to be
dogmatic and biased" (1994:94).

He claims that "a limited

amount of dogmatism is necessary for progress" (1994:16;
1989:49).

Thus, he begins to 'blame' not dogmatism as such,

but "intolerant dogmatism" for being a main obstacle to
science.

The weight shifts from a distinction between

dogmatism and criticism to a difference between tolerance
and intolerance.

Tenaciously defending a belief is an

intellectual virtue, but such tenacity must always be
coupled with tolerance (1994:45).

Intolerant dogmatism

presumably is defined as a disposition unwilling to modify,
correct, or even give up one's theory.
Popper provides yet another indication of the nuance
involved when he states that the critical attitude itself
"shares with the dogmatic attitude the quick adoption of a
schema of expectations ... but .. is ready to modify it, to
correct it, and even to give it up" (1989:49).

The

"adoption" of a schema by criticism cannot here be
understood as being "addicted" (1994:53), which is
characteristic of intolerant dogmatism.

Instead, this kind

of critical adoption does not wish to "be caught" in a
mental prison.

One only "accepts" or "commits" to a theory

for the time being: that is, tentatively.

Popper claims, in
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fact, that the entire question of theory "acceptance" is
over-rated (Popper 1994:102).

Even after a period of

sustained criticism one should not become too enamoured with
a theory.

He sees the idea of an accepted theory as a

"residue of the dreams of authoritarian science prevailing
in the days when people thought that we were just on the
verge of completing the task of science" (103) . 1
And yet, Popper also points out that one must be
careful not to adopt a theory too lightly either, since it
would seem to make little sense to speak of "adoption" at
all without some sense of commitment.

The positive sense of

this warning was indicated above--namely, that theories do
need to be tenaciously defended.

Put negatively, Popper

identifies a different extreme--at the opposite end of
dogmatism, as it were--that he characterizes as "following
intellectual fashion."

The fashion-oriented are attentive

to the "latest cry," and uncritically accept the currentlyruling fad.

They are "swayed by fashions," and "fear to be

regarded as laggards" (57) .

Here Popper touches upon what

could be called the intellectual vice of "jumping ship,"
which indicates a lack of loyalty or an over-inflated fear
of being 'caught' in error.
1

Such people give up too

Compare these comments with those of Imre Lakatos:

Belief may be a regrettably unavoidable biological
weakness to be kept under the control of
criticism: but commitment for Popper is an
outright crime. (Lakatos 1970: 92)
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quickly, and do not try to salvage or defend a position to
which they had committed themselves.

At the first sight of

a schema's failure to live up to one's expectations, it is
abandoned.
garde.

This is the vice of the intellectual avant-

Rather than risk being behind the times, such people

are "enthusiasts."
I said that such fashion-conscious individuals are at
the opposite extreme of intolerant dogmatists.

If

intolerant dogmatists refuse to give up their theory, then
the enthusiasts are too quick to give up their theory.

If

the intolerant dogmatist is insulated from criticism, then
the enthusiast is overly-sensitive to possible criticism.
What makes them very similar is that neither group is
willing to engage in the effort to modify and correct their
theory.

For Popper, this means that neither group is

willing to engage in the activity of criticism.

Dogmatism

and enthusiasm are really two sides of the same coin.
For Popper dogmatism and enthusiasm are species of
relativism.

The dogmatist retreats into a position that

cannot (or at least will not) be falsified, and the
enthusiast is driven to new positions constantly, without
the benefit of knowing whether its new position is an
advance upon the old one--that is, without the benefit of
having learned from its mistakes.

Between these two

positions Popper inserts his understanding of the critical
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tradition. 2

This tradition champions the belief that we

can learn from our mistakes.

Perhaps more importantly here,

this tradition acknowledges the possibility of its own error
(unlike intolerant dogmatism) and elevates the value of this
possibility (unlike enthusiasm) .
Popper himself is sometimes understood as being much
closer on the spectrum to the enthusiast than to the
dogmatist.

For example, whereas the dogmatist is not open

to criticism in any way, shape or form, the enthusiast at
least acknowledges criticism.

However, the form this

acknowledgement takes form distinguishes Popper from it,
insofar as it could be characterized vulgarly as positing
that "the truth is merely the latest lie that hasn't yet
been exposed."

Such a "bad faith" disposition toward

present conjectures motivates a desire to be agile enough
never to get "caught" in the error.

Error is inevitable and

necessary on this understanding, but we nonetheless
ceaselessly try to escape from this necessity.

And of

course the easiest way to effect such perpetual escapes is

Insofar as Popper is a believer in progress, then,
he does affirm (as we saw Kuhn and Blumenberg affirm in the
last chapter) that there must be the background stability of
a constant frame of reference for comparing progress. It is
also important to note that, for Popper, theories are not
simply compared or measured directly against reality--as
Kuhn seems to interpret him. Finally, Popper's own emphasis
on a critical tradition, and particularly on the difficulty
of transplanting a tradition where one did not formerly
exist, becomes extremely important for a fair understanding
and appraisal of his position. See "Towards a Rational
Theory of Tradition" (Popper 1989), p. 121.
2
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to always remain uncommitted to any scheme of expectations.
Some may hear a bit of Popper in these remarks:

the

difference may not be as sharp as Popper would like to think
it is.

However, what makes things interesting is that, as

this section has attempted to show, the difference between
Popper and the dogmatist is

llQ ~

sharp.

The way that

Popper would like to draw the sharp distinction in both
cases is through his emphasis on the "critical tradition,"
the tradition of trial and error. 3

We will see in the next

section, however, that both the severity of criticism and
the boldness of conjectures remain intimately related with
both of these extremes.

The importance of these

relationships, I would suggest, is that they indicate that
Popper's position does not rest exclusively on the prospects
of a 'naive' falsificationist strategy--as Kuhn, for
example, believes.
Refutation as the Conjecture to Stop Defending a Theo:ry
Two statements Popper makes in different contexts will
eventually be important for discovering a link between his
and Kuhn's work.

The first statement, that a scientist

should "leave it to others to fit his contribution into the

An emphasis that Popper also shares with Gadamer,
although, as we will see, there are considerable
differences. Specifically, Gadamer identifies Popper's
emphasis only with the "deliberate" side of human
experience, and not enough from its "suffering" side (a side
in which Kuhn might feel more at home) . See Truth and
Method (Gadamer 1990), p. 353n.299.
3
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framework of scientific knowledge" is the only one
recognized by Kuhn (Popper, 1970:51).

The spirit of this

statement indicates that an individual scientist considering
a conjecture should first test whether that conjecture can
be falsified.

That scientist should subject the conjecture

to the most severe tests, and only if it passes these tests
should it be opened to the criticism of others.

It is then

up to these others to criticize and test the conjecture,
and, if they fail to falsify the conjecture through these
exercises, they should then try to find a way to "tie it in"
to other conjectures that have stood up to testing and
criticism.
It must be noted that Popper pref aces this description
of scientific activity by stating that a conjecture is
offered in response to a particular problem or problemsituation.

In another context, Popper advises a young,

would-be scientist to go study the field, to find out what
scientists are working on (1989:129).

The young scientist

learns the problem-situation through such study.

The

anticipated result is that this scientist will take on a
problem that has arisen within the field and is relevant to
the field.

Any conjecture should then be in response to

such a problem.
Of course one of the problems this young scientist
faces is getting others to take notice of the conjecture
made.

Even if the conjecture has passed the scrutiny of the
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young scientist, will it be entertained as a possible
solution to the problem by would-be critics?

One must be

careful here not distort what Popper is talking about.

He

does not take the route that is being heavily explored
today--namely, to investigate the extent to which it is for
sociological reasons that one gets heard.

In other words,

it is not because one has the right degree, or is a member
in good standing in the right associations, etc., which
provide the conduit for being heard.

It is not the

discipline to which one belongs that makes the difference,
for problems cut right across disciplines (1989:67).

As

important as the other conditions are, for practical
reasons, we must not fall into the trap of consigning the
problems or the problem-situation to one discipline or
another.

There is no "natural" link between a discipline

and its problems.
For Popper, to suggest that it is ultimately for either
sociological or disciplinary reasons that science proceeds
as it does is to suggest that science has little choice but
to be either dogmatic or enthusiastic in its approach.
The individual scientist must not be primarily focused
on the discipline, or on what, at one time, Kuhn called the
disciplinary matrix.

One's primary commitment must be to

the problem--one needs to develop one's understanding of the
problem, and show that one has been attentive to it.
essence of scientific activity, for Popper, is that

The
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scientists, taken individually or as a group, must be
directed to problem-situations, and organize themselves
around such situations (rather than the reverse, which is
what Popper considers the sociological position to be) .
Scientists are not "guardians" of the problems (which is
precisely what he understands Kuhn's scientists to be,
insofar as Popper hears an echo of Plato's "closed society"
in Kuhn's normal science) . 4
Were we to grant Popper, for the time being, this
description of the scientific attitude, we would still face
at least two important questions:

How bold can the

individual scientist be in her conjectures concerning this
problem?

How aware must she be of the relationship of her

conjecture to those conjectures that have already passed
severe tests in the field?

Both of these questions, I

suggest, pertain to the meaning of the expression, "let
others tie it in."
There is no doubt that boldness is a primary virtue for
Popper.

He often advises the scientist to be bold in making

conjectures, as well as to make bold conjectures.

The first

characteristic is one with which few would argue, although
Popper's application of it is a bit vague, since boldness
can be a characteristic of both the revolutionary-minded
scientist hoping to make a significant contribution to the

Again, note the differences between Popper's
Kantian, and Kuhn's Aristotelian approaches to this issue.
4
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field, and the dogmatic-minded scientist insisting upon
holding the ground against hostile criticism.

Both

scientists are putting themselves forward, as it were.
The second characteristic, however--making conjectures
which are themselves bold--is the more controversial of the
two, and is a focus of Kuhn's disagreement with Popper's
position.

Many of Popper's statements claim that the duty

of the scientist is to make the boldest conjecture possible,
so that at any time there should be a large number of bold
conjectures available for testing and criticism.

All of

these conjectures would push the limits of what can be known
to maximum strain.

However, even here one always hooks up

with a certain understanding of the problem-situation, and
attempts to build upon gains previously made.

A conjecture,

in other words, always responds to both a problem-situation
and to previous conjectures that have so far sustained
severe testing.
In order to see that the boldness of which Popper
speaks is not quite so radical as he sometimes makes it
appear to be, we can link the boldness of conjectures to the
second of the two statements which link Popper to Kuhn.
Popper suggests that an important threat to a
scientist's continuing viability as a scientist is that a
problem-situation might 'pass you by' (1974:23).

Now on

first glance this might seem to indicate that it is of
primary importance for the individual scientist to "keep up"
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with the latest trends or developments.

However, Popper is

wary of the virtue of "keeping up," since it seems to be a
value most often esteemed by enthusiasts--i.e., those who
favor intellectual fashions and fads.

For people such as

these, the vice corresponding to the virtue of keeping up is
that of being a "laggard."

The virtue of keeping up, taken

in isolation, can lead to the mentality of the avant-garde.
What, then, does Popper mean by warning that the
scientist should not let the problem-situation pass her by?
I would suggest that the warning provides room for that
'legitimate' dogmatic impulse which Popper acknowledges,
which includes not only the character of boldly and
tenaciously defending a "pet theory," but now, here, also a
certain inertia.

It may seem strange to associate

intellectual inertia with the name of Popper, but the
context of the warning against letting the problem-situation
pass one by suggests this very strategy.
Popper suggests that one can become so overly-attentive
to developing precision in one's position, that in the
meantime the problem-situation may have developed in a
different direction than has your own work.

Popper is

suggesting that you should not attempt to boldly develop
your •resources' too early or too quickly--out of fear of
being unprepared to cope with problems and objections. 5
By using the word 'resource' here I am not
suggesting that the scientist, in Popper's view, should be
understood as 'withholding' or 'deferring' an account (as a
5
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Instead, by being a bit inert you may develop your position
and have a contribution to make only when you are called
upon to do so--that is, you may develop precision at the
right time precision is called for.

In the meantime, you

should tarry for a response to what you have offered, and/or
remain open to the developments in the problem-situation
which actually take place (and not simply to those which
have been anticipated by you) .

You must allow yourself the

chance to be given a "reception." 6
If this is in fact an accurate interpretation of
Popper's position, then Popper should be located differently
than in the place standing at the opposite extreme of
dogmatism.

Popper would stand between what he calls an

"intolerant dogmatism" and an enthusiastic avant-gardism.

deconstructist might argue)--but simply as giving himself
over {gQ_ a resourceful conversation partner) to the reaction
of the community--i.e., as opening himself to an exchange.
This certainly foreshadows Gadamer's work, but for another
interesting discussion of this, see Stanley Cavell, This New
Yet Unapproachable America (Albuquerque: Living Batch,
1989), p. 23ff.
6

"Reception," we will see, is a technical term in
Blumenberg's vocabulary. I will discuss it in Chapter Four
within the context of the "reception" of Copernicus's
theory. In brief, the issue hinges on what leads a
scientist to expect that she will be "given" a "reception?"
For Kuhn, normal science routinely provides this framework.
For Gadamer, it is tradition. But what about in
revolutionary periods? What is it that would lead
Copernicus to expect that his proposal might not just be
heard, but received--and hence, in Kuhn's terms, "normalize"
relations? Popper, of course, would not like the term
"normalized relations," nor the "routine" provision of a
framework, though his position here seems to call for some
such thing (Popper 1974:1152).
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One could interpret both of Popper's statements--"let others
fit it in," and "don't let the problem situation pass you
by 11 --as advice to always be on the cutting edge of things,
part of the vanguard.

And yet, being part of the cutting

edge might actually have to be understood a bit more
modestly, as incorporating a dogmatic element:

an element

which values tarrying at the spot where one is; an element
that balances the tendency that reflects an oversensitivity
to refutation; an element that--as Kuhn might put it-ultimately sees anomalies only where there are anomalies to
be found.
Another way to approach this aspect of Popper's
position is by way of the unfortunate duality that Kuhn
imposes on himself and Popper as a means to set himself off
from the latter.

Kuhn uses the language of challenger and

challenged, where presumably in the situations most
characteristic of scientific activity Kuhn believes the
scientist sees himself as challenged (by some puzzle,
through his understanding of the theory--or lack thereof),
whereas Popper believes the scientist sees himself as the
challenger (of the theory, in the name of the problem)
1970c:Sn.1).

(Kuhn

In other words, says Kuhn, when a difficulty

is encountered the scientist normally accuses himself, not
the theory.

Popper, on the other hand, is all too willing

to abandon the theory.

This is why Kuhn sees it as such a

mark against Popper's position to concede that falsification
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cannot be conclusive:

it undercuts the legitimacy of

Popper's advice to scientists to abandon a theory in
difficulty.

It is clear from this that Kuhn sees Popper

primarily as an enthusiast.
Were this to be his position, then Popper would face
some difficult questions.

For one, how is it that the

scientist achieves this status as challenger, particularly
since Popper himself suggests that the normal course of
study for the scientist is to begin by looking for
challenges, by looking for problems in the field.

The first

challenge for the young, would-be scientist is to find the
challenges the field finds relevant, and to come to
understand these challenges.

But how is it that such a

challenged young person soon finds herself to be the
challenger--how has a problem become so clear to her that
she can henceforth speak so boldly concerning it?
The duality between challenger and challenged, however,
cannot be successfully applied to Popper's position-particularly for the ends to which Kuhn dedicates it.

But

the failure of this application is quite instructive, for it
helps to uncover how the scientist operates no less as,
alternately, challenger and challenged in Popper's scheme
than in Kuhn's.

Specifically, for Popper the scientist

(whether young or established) does not have direct access
to a problem--at least not the kind of access through which
that scientist could take it upon herself to "speak in its

60

name."

For this reason, it is not the disposition to

conjecture (boldly or otherwise) that is important for
Popper, so much as the disposition to remain focussed on a
problem.

But, according to Popper, that disposition is

precisely the problem!

How does one address a problem?

How

does one identify it, get clear about it?
According to Popper, one certainly must make a
conjecture which purports to solve the problem--a conjecture
which, he says, will probably fail.

But between the

conjecture and the judgment of failure Popper does insert-contrary to Kuhn's reading of him--a significant amount of
scientific activity, activity which cannot simply be
described under the category of "testing"--as Kuhn
understands Popper to mean it:
maximum strain.

subjecting the theory to

To say that the theory is constantly being

maximally strained is a kind of hyperbole which conceals the
fact that the theory has not been "given over" to testing
because it has not yet (if the conjecturing scientist has
followed Popper's advice) been completely worked out in all
its possibilities.
For Popper, then, the idea of criticism is much more
complex than some parts of his writings seem to suggest, and
certainly more complex than Kuhn would seem to indicate.
Specifically, criticism plays upon what Kuhn might call a
"strategy":

the scientist who makes a conjecture must be

open to criticism in the sense that she must leave herself
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open to the response of other scientists--must put herself
in a position against which criticism might be offered.

But

being open to criticism includes not having already 'overdeveloped' or exhausted your resources on your own
anticipations of the direction the problem will take, but
rather expending those resources in an exchange opened at
the proper time.

In this sense, criticism doesn't open a

space for itself, but is also dependent upon the opening
provided by the scientist making the conjecture.

Both

conjecture and criticism are led by the developing problemsituation.

The success of criticism relies upon the

reciprocity of quid pro quo.

In this scenario,

falsification would still remain "knowing what it would take
for you to give up your theory ... ," but this "knowing in
advance .... " is tempered by the fact that the conjecture is
only developed to a certain point before it is opened to
criticism by adherents of the established scientific
conununity/tradition.
I would suggest that Popper recognizes that the virtue
of "opening yourself to criticism" incorporates a constraint
on the boldness of our conjectures.

If Popper seems to

favor severe criticism of conjectures, this is less because
he feels that we are in the position to act at any time as
challengers to our theories in the name of the problems,
than because he recognizes that our conjectures are always
constrained significantly by a strategy which necessarily
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"holds back" in order to open itself to criticism, and to
the demands of the developing problem situation.
"afford" criticism of the conjectures we favor.

We can
But we also

ne..e.Q to open ourselves to criticism, since our conjectures

are made in response to an understanding of the problemsi tuation that is always inadequate.
To understand Popper's position, it is again important
to see it suspended between two opposites.

On one hand,

Popper is an enemy of any description of scientific activity
which would reduce that activity to some "routine" or
another.

This is the threat he identifies with Kuhn's

position.

At best, such a routine is only effective as

"applied science."

As such, it falls short of the criticism

and novelty requisite for scientific advance.

But on the

other hand, Popper also recognizes that conjecture can also
be "too bold" or even a bit "wild."

When Popper speaks in

these terms, he indicates that advance in science is not
constrained

~by

ideology or human failing.

That is,

although Popper focuses most on the obstacles to advance
presented by ideology and human failing, there are other,
positive constraints operative within conjecture and
refutation that must be recognized, not just these negative
ones:

specifically, the question/answer framework as

currently established by the scientific community {the
"field").
If the foregoing presents a fair and more nuanced
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reading of Popper than is sometimes offered, then the
question which can be addressed to Popper is the following:
Having affirmed the necessary function of the "field," how
much or how little can one disregard it as a constraint on
the conjectures that could plausibly be entertained,
criticized, and tested at any time?

Of course one may grant

to Popper that the "field" is not reducible to any
particular discipline, since problems may cut across many
disciplines at any one time.

And yet, the field does not

seem to be reducible to just the problems either.

We have

no independent access to the problems as individuals, but
recognize that the problem might always move in an
unanticipated direction through the efforts of others.
Popper does affirm the role of a discipline in introducing a
scientist to the field, and it does not seem that "a"
discipline ever becomes dispensible.

At the very least, the

discipline seems instrumental to criticism.
At one point he calls his view a romantic ideal or a
heroic ideal of science (1974:977).

Scientific activity is

represented best through the bold activity of its heroes.
When Popper speaks this way, the role of the field or
discipline--the scientific "community" itself--seems to be
seriously subordinated.

On the other hand, this rhetoric

about boldness should not disguise the fact that Popper
admits that naive falsification cannot underwrite the
activities such heroic boldness requires.

But the important
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question here is:

why would such heroic boldness not become

linked to a supersensitivity to refutation?

For Popper it

must not be so linked--but in order to avoid this link
boldness must, rather paradoxically, open itself toward
dogmatism.

Popper even associates this kind of dogmatism

with debate (1974:).

Dogmatism. it would seem. is at the

very core of criticism.

It is not an external extra added

to it--a supplement; so much so, in fact, is dogmatism
necessary to criticism, that the results of debate are never
quite decisive:

"As always, science is conjecture.

You

have to conjecture when to stop defending a favourite
theory, and when to try a new one" (1974:984).
Now, if conjecture should be bold,then it seems that
not only should one's conjectures themselves be bold, but
the act of conjecturing should be bold; in other words, one
should boldly conjecture that one is in need of a new bold
conjecture.

But even here, one would not do this at the

price of debate--if one were to ALWAYS determine that
boldness is in order, then there would be no way of
separating this from supersensitivity to refutation.

There

seems to be needed a kind of courage to suffer through a
debate with the tradition, 1 to toughen one's sensitivity,
filld to discover the possibilities inherent in the theory you
(force yourself to) defend and/or attack.

Boldness, then,

Perhaps this is, after all, the suffering side of
experience to which Gadamer seeks to draw our attention.
1
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is not always simply a framework breaker.

It is possible

that boldness is a virtue that knows when to defend and when
to attack.
Aristarchus:

A Case Study

Popper does not seem to have settled in his own mind
exactly what constitutes boldness and when boldness has
become overextended--what he calls a bit wild.

For example,

he says at one point that the hypotheses of Aristarchus
"seem to have been too bold, and they were soon forgotten"
(1994:43).

On this reading, it is possible to conjecture

too boldly, so much so that the hypothesis is not seriously
entertained, has no effect, and is soon forgotten.

Yet at

another point, Popper says that the theory could not be
accused of being too bold--at least not for everyone--and
Popper cites Seleucus' support for the hypothesis as
support.

He goes on to say,

And yet, for some obscure reason, only a few brief
reports of the theory have survived. Here is a
glaring case of the only too frequent failure to
keep alternative ideas alive.
Whatever the details of the explanation, the
failure was probably due to dogmatism and
intolerance. But new ideas should be regarded as
precious, and should be carefully nursed-especially if they seem to be a bit wild. I do
not suggest that we should be eager to accept new
ideas jJ.w_t. for the sake of their newness. But we
should be anxious not to suppress a new idea even
if it does not appear to us to be very good.
(1994; 14) .
Two comments are in order here.

First, it is clear

that Popper's main concern is that alternatives ideas must
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be kept alive.

According to Popper, ideas are "only too

rare," and may easily, though not justifiably, be neglected.
One of Popper's biggest worries is that specialization and
"the publication explosion may kill ideas" {14) .

Ideas may

easily get submerged in the flood of publication.

Neither

the scientific spirit nor the critical tradition are
guaranteed.

They can be lost.

In fact, Popper seems to be

quite worried that they are presently being sacrificed
{1994:51).

I think that one must link Popper's concern for

the availability of alternatives with his "heroic" view of
science:

because ideas can easily be submerged, we need

heroes and heroic efforts to continually bring forth new
ideas.

We need bold conjectures proposed by bold

conjecturers.
The second conunent pertains to Popper's claim that
failur~

to keep alternatives alive is "probably due" to

dogmatism and intolerance.

One can credit Popper for not

making the claim too strong, but at the same time may
question whether the gap opened up between the arena where
conjectures are made and that where intolerant dogmatism
reigns is not too wide.

Might there not be other reasons,

factors, or influences involved that could assist in the
effort to account for the neglect of alternative ideas?
In other words, one might ask why this failure is
necessarily or always illegitimate--the mark of bad science.
We might even ask, in light of the above statement that one
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must conjecture when to stop defending a theory, a Popperian
question:

why couldn't it be that the failure to keep

alternative ideas alive is due to making the conjecture that
one can make do without these ideas?

Why should this

conjecture be ruled out. or be considered a bad conjecture?
How is it that this conjecture is one that should not have
been made?

Is some mistake made in conjecturing that one

can do without these conjectures {ideas)?

Was, for example,

some mistake made in not following Aristarchus' conjecture?
Doesn't the very process of science involve the conjecture,
the risk, that one can make do without a particular
conjecture?
To repeat, this is not to say that intolerance plays no
part, but it also need not account for the entire failure.
In short, the failure to keep alternative ideas alive can
sometimes be traced to the process of scientific activity
itself, just as it can sometimes be traced to intolerant
dogmatism.
Of course, to say that one rejects a conjecture because
one has made the conjecture that one can do without it, must
include the proviso that one has reasons for doing so.

The

presence of such reasons would separate this rejection from
a rejection due solely to intolerant dogmatism.

Here we

seem to reach one of those points where Popper wants to
distance himself from Kuhn, for Popper seems to believe that
Kuhn's vision of scientific activity permits {and even
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praises) intolerant dogmatism--i.e., dogmatism without
reasons.

In other words, on Popper's reading of Kuhn, the

failure to keep alternatives alive is not because of the
presence of good reasons, but only because of a dogmatic
spirit.
But, from Kuhn's perspective, if Popper .d.Qe.s. recognize
that there can be legitimate reasons for failing to keep
alternative alive, then he owes us a more detailed account
of how this is not only an important characteristic of
scientific activity, but actually serves that activity.
Kuhn's description of normal science, I will argue, attempts
to provide just such an account.

I will return to this

issue in the last chapter, after the contributions made by
Gadamer and Blumenberg have been incorporated into the
discussion.
Summary
As we have seen, Popper grants a central place to
dogmatism.

In fact, we found dogmatism to be at the very

heart of revolutionary criticism.

For neither Popper nor

for Kuhn is dogmatism a passive target for criticism (an
acquiescence or complacency in a present, satisfying, and
determinable achievement), nor is it a failure to engage in
criticism.

Criticism remains accountable to the framework

it would reject, insofar as it must offer an account of that
framework-- what it has been, what it has achieved--and to
preserve within itself the competencies to match or surpass
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those achievements.
We saw that for Popper one has to conjecture when to
stop defending a pet theory.

Refutation of a theory always

includes an element of conjecture.

One conjectures that

one's determination of what the theory is legitimates trying
a new conjecture.

But unless the conjecture to reject is

irreversible (and Popper says nothing to indicate he
believes it is necessarily irreversible), it must remain
open to the criticism of the community of defenders.

It

cannot simply accuse these def enders of an intolerant
dogmatism.
What is important about this is that it raises a
question about the steady availability of frameworkbreaking.

Popper acknowledges that we are "prisoners caught

in the framework of our theories" (Popper 1970:56), though
he believes we can break free of any framework at any time.
Is it only an "attitude" toward our present condition which
decides whether we will passively remain within a framework
or break free from it?
It would seem that for Popper more is involved than
simply an attitude.

Popper would probably say that to be

open to criticism is already to be disposed toward breaking
free of a framework.

But being open to criticism does not

mean that one cannot legitimately be a defender of a
framework, as Popper admits.

Furthermore, being disposed

toward breaking free of a framework is not something which
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Kuhn rejects (Kuhn 1970b:242).

Far less does he believe

that normal science immunizes itself against criticism--for
Kuhn does leave the door open for the revolutionary impulse
at any and all times (248) .
If we understand Popper's point about the value of the
revolutionary disposition as intending the generation of
criticism from outside the framework, then we might
understand Kuhn's point as intending the generation of
criticism from within the framework.

This means not seeing

a framework only as an obstacle to progress--as a dogmatic
shackle weighing down the critical spirit--but as an
enabling condition that makes criticism possible.

Failure

to recognize the enabling function of a framework, we saw,
is the characteristic failure of "enthusiasm."

No less than

the intolerant dogmatist, the enthusiast immunizes itself
from the criticism of that from which it broke.
As we will see in the next chapter, an appreciation for
the enabling function of a framework--an appreciation for
tradition--is what Gadamer contributes to this issue.

CHAPTER FOUR
GADAMER'S REHABILITATION OF TRADITION
Were we to begin to define Gadamer's notion of tradition
in the terms used at the end of the last chapter--terms
familiar to Popper and Kuhn--we might identify it initially
as a framework which is not just an obstacle to progress,
but a positive enabling condition for it.

In Kuhn's terms,

it is a framework which "must be lived with and explored"
(1970b:242).

The rehabilitation of our understanding of

tradition has been a central feature of Gadamer's
hermeneutics.
In this chapter we will begin to see how Gadamer's
hermeneutics clarifies the necessary and positive role
dogmatism and tradition play in the activity of criticism.
First, I will confirm Richard J. Bernstein's interpretation
of the parallel between Kuhn's and Gadamer's views on
judgment (phronesis), over against John Caputo's conjunction
of Kuhn with Jacques Derrida.

On Caputo's reading, normal

science fully dissolves into a state of revolution, within
which state the values once shared by scientists become
"utterly ineffective."

Kuhn's position, I will argue,

suggests no such meltdown of judgment, nor of the conditions
supporting it.
71
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Second, I will argue that Gadamer's analysis of the
structure of experience is important for showing how both
normal and revolutionary science involve experiences that
are both falsifying and confirming.

For Gadamer, the

process of experience is essentially negative, though
falsification can also confirm aspects of tradition.
Tradition passes on that which has not been falsified.

In

Popper's terms, the expectations by which we are guided have
withstood every test to which we have subjected them.
Third, the essentially negative structure of experience
is articulated through the model of dialogue--through a
process of question and answer.

"We cannot have experiences

without asking questions" (Gadamer 1990:362).

We experience

through the openness breached by asking a question--an
openness which is not unlimited, however:

that is, not

without horizon or framework (362) .
In these three ways Gadamer's hermeneutics develops
Kuhn's position on the dogmatism implicit in normal science.
The problem which will arise, however, is that Gadamer's
hermeneutics leaves little room for the deployment of the
concept of revolution--which is a central affirmation of
Kuhn's philosophy of science.

By way of anticipation of the

points to be made in the final chapter, I offer the
following assessment of some of the differences between
these two.
Although Kuhn's claims concerning the dynamic of normal
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science share with Gadamer the belief that criticism can be
generated from within a framework, Kuhn departs from Gadamer
in insisting that criticism does not simply reform that
framework.

For Gadamer, the framework of tradition is

renewed by means of a fusion of horizons that rises "to a
higher universality that overcomes not only our own
particularity but also that of the other" (1990:305).

For

Kuhn, on the other hand, the framework finally becomes
incapable of sustaining the very questions and answers it
originally asserted to be within its competence, and thereby
undergoes a crisis in identity--so much so, in fact, that
scientists find it difficult to understand what the
framework is:

in what its achievements consist, and where

its competencies lie (Kuhn 1980:190-1).

The dogmatic

impulse aims at the restoration of this identity.

The

revolutionary impulse also serves to identify what the old
framework was--and insofar as this is the case, there is
considerable overlap in motivation and activity.

However,

the revolutionary impulse ultimately manifests itself not in
the service of reform, but rather in order to identify that
over against which it may identify itself.

For a

hermeneutic development and clarification of these very same
points, we will need to turn, in the last chapter, to the
work of Hans Blumenberg.
The Dispute over Values
The similarity of Kuhn's position on values and
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Gadamer's appropriation of the Aristotelian idea of
phronesis has been noted by many commentators, most notably
Bernstein (1983) and Rorty (1979) .

As Bernstein points out,

phronesis is a kind of practical rationality that involves
deliberation and choice (1983:54).

Moreover, the judgments

characteristic of phronesis do not so much reflect the
application of rules, but rather the application of values.
Whereas judgment according to rules involves the subsumption
of the particular under the universal, judgment according to
values involves the identification and interpretation of .the
universal appropriate to the particular.

Furthermore, just

as phronesis is developed within a community or polis, so
for Kuhn the deliberations guided by values are most
effective within the practice of normal science.
In what follows I will not challenge these particular
similarities, but rather test their limits.

Before doing

so, however, it may be helpful at this point to briefly
introduce the orientation of Gadamer's work and its
relevance to the issues developed in the previous two
chapters.
The title of Gadamer's main work, Truth and Method, is a
bit deceiving, insofar as Gadamer does not attempt within
its pages to find a method proper to the human sciences--far
less to claim to have discovered such a method; rather,
Gadamer attempts to show that the concern with a need for
"method" provoked an attempt by the human sciences to model
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themselves after the pattern of the natural sciences--the
"method" of which was seen as one of its most significant
accomplishments.

The modelling of the human sciences after

the fashion of the natural sciences thus arose from a common
concern--the foreignness [Fremdheit] we feel in relationship
to the world (Gadamer 1990:65) . 1

It is important to see

that Gadamer is not simply claiming that the methodological
aspirations of the natural sciences were transferred to the
human sciences, as a model of success.

Instead, he is

arguing that if such a transference did take place, it is
somewhat understandable as a response due to the similarity
between their concern with foreignness.
Gadamer's claim is that, particularly in the human
sciences, method does not overcome our foreignness, but
actually exacerbates it. 2

Particularly in the human

sciences, method alienates the knower from her own
"historicity," and from her own standpoint within tradition
(a point particularly important for the issue of this
paper).

The primary focus of Gadamer's criticism is this

Bernstein
(1983:16ff.)
1

2

calls

this

the

Cartesian

anxiety

The very deployment of method both contributes to
and reveals the contours of our foreignness. Rather than it
being the case, then, that we should never have gone down
the path of "method," Gadamer seems to be suggesting that
following this path has served an important hermeneutical
function--has served to reveal hidden dimensions of meaning,
or hidden dimensions of our foreignness.
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alienation. 3

The upshot of Gadamer's criticism is that the

self-alienating concern for method that has characterized
both the natural and human sciences has resulted in the
relativism of historicism, and the objectivization of
tradition into a dead, non-authoritative, museum-piece
curiosity.

As Richard J. Bernstein characterizes it:

we

find ourselves in an unenviable predicament between
objectivism and relativism. 4
With this as a background, we can now turn the issue of
values and their role in scientific activity.
As I have already pointed out, for Kuhn the concept of
crisis plays a central role in his account of the dynamic of
scientific activity, a role which is set-off against the
stability characteristic of normal science.
there is no such balance.
for Derrida.

For Gadamer,

Nor, for that matter, is there

To put the issue somewhat formulaically:

if

for Gadamer phronesis is always operative and always
effective, such that one may question if there ever are
crises, and if for Derrida phronesis is neither always
operative nor always effective, such that crises are
prevalent and persistent, then for Kuhn phronesis is always

Note, then, that the standpoint for Gadamer's own
criticism is a position within tradition, at which point our
alienation has been revealed through our own contributions
to, and participation in, its intensification.
3

The point which is reflected in the title of
Bernstein's book: Beyond Objectivism and Relativism (1983);
see also: Blumenberg (1987:123ff.), and Nietzsche (1995).
4
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operative and effective, but not in the same way during
crisis as it is during periods of relative stability (normal
science) .
For Gadamer, the relevance to hermeneutics of
Aristotle's analysis of phronesis lies the task of
"application" which both share (1990:315).

Specifically,

both are concerned with the task of "applying something
universal to a particular situation" (312) .

For Aristotle,

according to Gadamer, "the task of making a moral decision
is that of doing the right thing in a particular situation-i .e., seeing what is right within the situation and grasping
it" (317).

But the task of application is more problematic

than this (since this description of phronesis does not
adequately distinguish it from techne) :

"For we can only

apply something that we already have; but we do not possess
moral knowledge in such a way that we already have it and
then apply it to specific situations" (317).

Instead, our

knowledge of a law is "productively determined by" its
application to a particular case (38) .

The task of

application in hermeneutics is remarkably the same, in that
the appropriation of tradition by understanding is a
productive determination of its possibilities, by means of
its application to our situation. 5
Although Bernstein's analysis links Gadamer's and

s This is why Gadamer calls understanding
"participating in an event of tradition" (290) .
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Kuhn's positions, he does direct the question to Gadamer
whether, in fact, phronesis can be sufficient and effective
in times of crisis.

Bernstein points out that phronesis

presupposes not only the existence of a community, but also
the existence of nomoi within the community (1983:157).
Might we not experience a crisis concerning what norms
phronesis should draw upon?

Might not the problem of the

interpretation (or application) of norms be extended in some
cases to the problems of the shared acceptance and stability
of the norms themselves (157)?

Specification of norms

through application is one thing, but might not confusion
run so deep as to press the question which norms are the
appropriate ones to specify (158)?

Such problems, says

Bernstein, raise the question concerning the conditions for
the operation of phronesis.
John Caputo focuses his attack at precisely this
point.

According to Caputo, there are points in the history

of science when the phronesis of the scientist will not do,
because what that phronesis presupposes is no longer
effective (Caputo 216) .

He states,

Phronesis functions only within an existing
framework, an established paradigm. It is a
fundamentally conservative notion in the best sense
of that word, that is, it knows how to keep
something alive, to renew it in changing
circumstances but always within the compass of an
established order. It requires a stable paradigm, a
more or less fixed order. Aristotle conceived of
the functioning of phronesis within a fundamentally
stable polis, not within a period of revolutionary
conflict. (Caputo 217)
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In a letter to Bernstein which the latter appended to
his Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, Gadamer for his part
questions whether we are ever in a state characterizable as
collapse.

He says, "The conflict of traditions we have

today does not seem to me to be anything exceptional"
{Bernstein 1983:264).

He also claims that "the displacement

of human reality never goes so far that no forms of
solidarity exist any longer."

As my presentation of

Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics proceeds in more
detail, it will become clear why Gadamer cannot permit, much
less imagine, a situation in which the breakdown of
community, or the paradigmatic, normative framework, could
be complete.

The solidarity and consensus of "community" is

never simply the accomplishment of the members of the
community.

The community always points beyond itself and

draws upon resources that surpass what the community
realizes at any time.

The corrnnunity always stands within a

relationship to what Gadamer calls die Wirkungsgeschichte, a
relationship which above all else must remain "open," and of
which we must become "conscious."
According to Caputo, however, Kuhn departs
dramatically from Gadamer when he argues that the criteria
upon which phronesis draws--the criteria characterizing a
good theory:

accuracy, scope, consistency, etc.--are in

times of crisis "utterly ineffective" in resolving such
conflict {Caputo 218).

In fact, these criteria "are of no
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practical use," presumably because they are indeterminate-quite unlike "the determinacy of an Aristotelian virtue"
(218) . 6

Caputo draws three conclusions from this:

First, rather than search for more determinate
criteria with the aid of which phronesis could carry out it
function,
... we must confess the play, for what causes
phronesis to founder is just the unavailability of
criteria. It is only after a free argument has
played itself out that we can afterward, with a
logic that limps along lamely after the fact,
reconstruct what sort of moves reason made which won
the day. And it is only afterward, after the
conditions for a new wave of normal science have
been forged, that phronesis can again have a
place ... (Caputo 310, nlO).
Phronesis is ineffective for deliberation and cannot provide
reasons for the choices made.

Whatever the nature of the

"free argument," it is not phronetic.

We can only

reconstruct reasons after the fact--presumably from the
perspective of the winner.
Second, what is at stake in such times of conflict "is
not only a particular paradigm but science itself (219) ."
And with this, Kuhn's position becomes very close to that of
Derrida.

It is what Caputo calls "Kuhn's most Parisian

moment (220) ."
Normal science flourishes because of its
authoritarian practices. But that is not an
objection to normal science for Kuhn or Derrida. Il
.f.aJJ.t. lg verite. Science flourishes because of the
Here I refer the reader back to the debate with
Laudan. For a more nuanced reading of the "determinacy"
implied by Aristotelian virtue, see Gadamer 1990:312-324.
6
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violence with which it enforces its paradigm (which
is a Parisian way of saying that the scientific
community is organized around a paradigm which it
believes in) and because of the violence that the
paradigm inflicts on the world (a Parisian way of
saying a conceptual framework, a way of seeing
things) . (220)
Science, then, is characterizable as a

11

violence 11 --against

both itself, in its communal aspect, and the world.

Caputo

hesitates here, however, recognizing that this
characterization seems closer to Feyerabend than to Kuhn.
He therefore puts conditions on the convergence.
If Kuhn thinks that there actually is a time when
"normal science" is peacefully settled into place
and has the faith of everyone, then a Derridean
would suspect that that is a sirnplif ication (just as
he would suspect Heidegger's epochal units). If, on
the other hand, Kuhn thinks that normal science is
honored more in the breach than in the observance,
then Derrida would not object to this idea. (221)
Caputo recognizes and challenges the position Kuhn might
like to adopt here--a position less radical than that of
Derrida and considerably more Gadarnerian.

The challenge is

whether there ever is, in fact, a time when normal science
actually exists, and, if so, whether such an existence can
claim anything more for itself than the violence by which it
imposes itself.
Third, for Kuhn the dynamic of science does not lead
to a tighter convergence or match between paradigm and
reality.

What this means, for Caputo, is that "the shift

f rorn one paradigm to another does not stern f rorn a deeper
insight into nature but from a shift of strategy in coping
with the puzzles faced by the scientist, in coping with the
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flux (221} ."

Kuhn "intimates," therefore, that the

projections of science are "fictions," which do not disclose
the things themselves, but rather issue in "social
consensus" and "pragmatic will-to-power" (221-2} .

In short,

Kuhn's position, on Caputo's reading, represents a serious
departure from that of Gadamer.

If Kuhn wishes to retain

proximity to Gadamer's end of the spectrum, then the general
challenge to him--as the summation and thrust of the three
conclusions given above--is how to account for the dynamic
of science, and especially of normal science, as being
something other or more than imposed violence.
Kuhn's position, in fact, does retain some proximity
to Gadamer's.

His claims, to that effect, are two-fold.

First, the criteria characterizing a good paradigm are not
indeterminate such that they are "utterly ineffective" or
"of no practical use" apart from that paradigm.

Second,

science does not simply impose paradigms on nature by an act
of violence only euphemistically called agreement.

Nature

cannot simply be forced into conceptual boxes, and certainly
not arbitrarily so.
Concerning the first point, Kuhn argues that if the
criteria were as indeterminate, ineffective, and useless as
Caputo suggests, then the objections levelled at Kuhn of
"mob psychology" would be warranted.

But for Kuhn, "one

characteristic of a mob is its rejection of values which its
members ordinarily share.

Done by scientists, the result
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would be the end of their science, and the Lysenko case
suggests that it would be .... If the specialists' group
behaves as a mob, renouncing its normal values, then science
is already past saving" (Kuhn 1970b:263).

For Kuhn, then,

the indeterminacy of values neither warrants their
rejection, nor indicates their practical uselessness and
utter ineffectiveness.

Furthermore, in the conflict between

paradigms, science itself is not at stake, although the
nature of a particular science may be. 1

If scientists act

like a mob, science would not be "at stake," it would
already be at an end and past saving.

Finally, if the

decisions made during conflicts are given only a "historical
character," or "are made only with 'hindsight,'" such that
we can only reconstruct the results from the perspective of
the victors, then the function of values within the process-upon which Kuhn insists--is denied, and one is left with
Caputo's nebulous "free argument."
Concerning the second point, for Kuhn might does not
make right.

Caputo's interpretation puts great weight upon

the statement in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
that normal science is "a strenuous and devoted attempt to
force nature into the conceptual boxes supplied by

As we will see, part of Blumenberg's contribution
to the issue is that, even if science were somehow at stake
at this level, there would still remain a continuity of
formal, indeterminate positions which do initially exercise
a determinate influence--by taking on a specific meaning
content.
1
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professional education" (Kuhn 1970:5).

Later in that work

Kuhn weakens the claim somewhat, claiming that "that
enterprise seems an attempt to force nature into the
preformed and relatively inflexible box that the paradigm
supplies" (24).

However, Caputo overlooks certain other

attempts made by Kuhn to clarify his position.

Kuhn denies

that scientists "first decide what they agree about and then
enforce it both on their colleagues and on nature" (Kuhn
1970b:260).
Later in the same essay Kuhn states,
By the same token, no part of the argument here or
in my book implies that scientists may choose any
theory they like so long as they agree in their
choice and thereafter enforce it. Most of the
puzzles of normal science are directly presented by
nature, and all involve nature indirectly. Though
different solutions have been received as valid at
different times, nature cannot be forced into an
arbitrary set of conceptual boxes. On the contrary,
the history of proto-science shows that normal
science is possible only with very special boxes,
and the history of developed science shows that
nature will not indefinitely be confined in any set
which scientists have constructed so far. (Kuhn
1970b:263)
Kuhn's position is either incoherent or more complex and
delicate than Caputo suggests.
Rather than seeking a balance between Gadamer and
Derrida, it might now appear that Kuhn's position is not
only proximal to Gadamer's, but actually squares with it.
If the shared values are not rejected, then whereof does one
speak of "crisis?"

Are scientific values a firm underlayer

of support, so that crisis (or revolution) is only a
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surface-level phenomenon, or perhaps even only the
proverbial "matter of (subjective) perception?"

What makes

Kuhn's position on values any different from that of
Gadamer?

What led Caputo, moreover, to believe that for

Kuhn such values were utterly ineffective and of no
practical use?

Could Caputo have been so mistaken about

Kuhn's position?
The mistake may lie in Caputo's characterization of
utter ineffectiveness.

For Kuhn, the values are not utterly

ineffective, although they may not be persistently and
substantially effective in their applications within
scientific practice.

Both the mistake of Caputo's

interpretation and the difference from Gadamer's position
rests in the problem of the function of values.

The

indeterminacy of values does not simply warrant their
rejection.

Such indeterminacy, rather, must lead one to

focus on their function both within normal science and the
crisis situation.

The shared values upon which phronesis

draws have an "abstract-universal" moment (ala Hegel)--but
the determination of their meaning carried out independently
of a given historical moment or scientific community is not
very full or rich.
More importantly, a focus on the "substantive"
development over time of a particular value's meaning cannot
account for all the specific determinations made through
that time frame.

One must turn to the function of the value
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within the process of deliberation and decision in order to
uncover the rationality operative in scientific activity, as
well as the place of values within it.

So, for example, a

"dogmatic" stance--whether about a theory or a value--is not
simply adopted at will, but rather serves a necessary
function within scientific activity.

Although Kuhn

sometimes speaks of this function as "only" a strategy, he
also claims that it is essential to scientific activity and
progress.

As essential, it is not "simply" a sociological

characterization of cormnunity-structure.

The function

dictates the adoption, not only of the "dogmatic" attitude
characteristic of normal science, but of the "crisis"
attitude as well.
How then does Kuhn's position differ from Gadamer's?
Fundamentally in that Gadamer's hermeneutics leaves little
room for the deployment of idea of revolution.

Kuhn does

account for the possibility of crises in the identity of the
cormnunity (tradition) and revolutionary re-constitutions of
such identity (as well as of the values which will guide
that cormnunity).

However, such a crisis does not mean that

the values once shared by the cormnunity have become utterly
ineffective.

Instead, as Blumenberg suggests, they now

gravitate around positions central to determining what the
cormnunity was (what the old paradigm was--what content
occupied these positions), and what the new community
purports to be (what content now reoccupies these
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positions).

In short, as we shall see in the next chapter,

the kind of meaning-content that comes to occupy a
particular position--the kind of substitution that becomes
possible (and which is part of the meaning of the word
"paradigm")--can have a revolutionary effect on the
application of values (their selection and specification) .
The challenges issuing from both Gadamer's and
Derrida's positions should now be clear.

Kuhn's attempt to

maintain a balance which incorporates both stability and
instability into the process of scientific activity is
challenged from both sides:

by the position which sees all

such stability as imposed violence, and by the position
which sees any such instability as something considerably
less than crisis.
Gadamer's Analysis of the Structure of Experience
Two sections of Truth and Method are particularly
important for showing how both normal (and revolutionary)
science involve experiences that both falsify and confirm
various aspects of tradition--such that confidence in
tradition is not simply affirmed dogmatically, without
reasons, but is confirmed by continuing experience. 8

The

first section, "The Concept of Experience and the Essence of
the Hermeneutic Experience," develops Gadamer's

a I ref er the reader here to the discussion at the end
of the last chapter.
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understanding of the "negativity" of experience.
section, "The Model of Platonic Dialectic,"

The second

develops the

idea of an "openness to" experience, provoked by its
essential negativity, by means of the articulation of a
model of critical dialogue.

In short, the falsification and

confirmation of tradition is an achievement of dialogue.
According to Gadamer, the process of experience is
essentially negative (353) .

In this regard Gadamer himself

acknowledges a relationship to Popper's idea of conjecture
and refutation (353n.299).

The word "experience" has two

different senses for us in everyday use:

there are the

experiences that conform to our expectations, and the new
experiences that occur to us.

The former sense of

experience relates to repetition and confirmation.

These

allow us to predict what was previously unexpected.

The

latter sense of experience--the sense Gadamer calls
11

genuine 11 --is the negative sense:

the sense which affirms

that our expectations are violated.

Gadamer says, "If a new

experience of an object occurs to us, this means that
hietherto we have not seen the thing correctly and now know
it better.

Thus the negativity of experience has a

curiously productive meaning (353) ."

In Popper's terms, one

learns that one was mistaken.
New experience is negative experience.

"Only something

different and unexpected can provide someone who has
experience with a new one (353) ."

Negative, productive
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experience can only occur once.

Having occured, at this

point repetition of the experience supports the negative
experience.

In other words, experience in the former of the

two senses spoken of above takes over from and confirms
experience in the latter sense.
understood as a process:

The "taking over" should be

experience is engaged in a cycle

of expectation and violation, of hope and disappointment.
But Gadamer goes further.

Even a cyclical understanding

of the process of experience might lead one to believe that
repetition and confirmation is the privileged member in the
process:

"It is true, of course, that part of the nature of

experience is to be continually confirmed; it is, as it
were, acquired only by being repeated" (353) .

Nevertheless,

Gadamer says that negative experience is "experience is the
genuine sense" (353).

In other words, negative experience

is more than a troublesome occasion or obstacle keeping one
from getting on with the process of repetition.
as more than a "corrective" to the process.

It serves

The reason why

we might see negative experience as only a troublesome
obstacle, according to Gadamer, is that we are tempted to
conceive of experience in terms of something that surpasses
it, or in terms of the end or final state of experience--a
state in which experience itself would be obviated.

Instead

of succumbing to this temptation, we should see that "the
truth of experience always implies an orientation toward new
experience.

That is why a person who is called experienced
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has become so not only through experiences but is also open
t..Q new experience (355) ."

The end of experience consists in being experienced.
Being experienced consists in openness.

Being experienced

means to be open to new experience--expecting violations,
expecting the unexpected.

"The consununation of his

experience, the perfection that we call "being experienced,"
does not consist in the fact that someone already knows
everything and knows better than anyone else.

Rather, the

experienced person proves to be, on the contrary, someone
who is radically undogmatic; who, because of the many
experiences he has had and the knowledge he has drawn from
them, is particularly well equipped to have new experiences
and to learn from them.

The dialectic of experience has its

proper fulfillment not in definitive knowledge but in the
openness to experience that is made possible by experience
itself" (355) .

Negative experience is "genuine" experience

insofar as "every experience worthy of the name thwarts an
expectation (356) ."
Genuine experience reverts back upon the being of the
one who is experienced.
finitude (357) ."

"Experience is experience of human

It is "that whereby man becomes aware of

his finiteness (357) ."

"Genuine experience is experience of

one's own historicity (357) ."

In negative experience, we

experience our f initude insofar as our expectations are
violated, our hopes are disappointed, our plans go
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unfulfilled.

"The experienced man knows that all foresight

is limited and all plans uncertain (357) ."

Gadamer

continues,
In him is realized the truth value of experience. If
it is characteristic of every phase- of the process
of experience that the experienced person acquires a
new openness to new experiences, this is certainly
true of the idea of being perfectly experienced. It
does not mean that experience has ceased and a
higher form of knowledge is reached (Hegel), but
that for the first time experience fully and truly
is. In it all dogmatism, which proceeds from the
soaring desires of the human heart, reaches an
absolute barrier. Experience teaches us to
acknowledge the real. The genuine result of
experience, then--as of all desire to know--is to
know what is. But "what is," here, is not this or
that thing, but "what cannot be destroyed" (Ranke)
(357).
In this passage Gadamer's Popperian affinities shine
through. 9

The experienced person is the one whose posture

is open, a stance that could easily be appreciated by the
author of The Open Society and Its Enemies.

Furthermore,

the result of experience is to know what is, what cannot be
destroyed--which echoes Popper's structure of conjecture and
refutation.

That which stands against all of our efforts to

refute it--which remains inviolate--is that which can be
characterised as what is.
But more needs to be said about the structure of
openness, and this can be accomplished by means of a

Although, as pointed out earlier, one must not
overlook the "suffering side" of experience which Gadamer
affirms as essential to "openness," one example of which we
discussed earlier--the openness required to suffer through a
debate with tradition.
9
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question directed at Gadamer's understanding of negative
experience:

Does Gadamer recognize, as Kuhn and Popper do,

that not every negative experience is falsifying?

Of

course, Gadamer could say that an experience is identifiable
as negative only if it does falsify, but this would not
answer the question of how to discriminate between an
experience which is not falsifying (and yet which could not
be said to be confirming) and an experience which could be
said to be falsifying.

Could it be that Gadamer's

interpretation of negative experience remains "naive?"
Gadamer's analysis of the structure of experience makes
the claim that negative experience is primary.
experience is bilateral:

Genuine

we not only call something into

question by means of our expectations but we ourselves are
called into question by the violation of those expectations.
The transition is thereby made from the analysis of
experience to the logic of question and answer.
In the section entitled, "The Model of Platonic
Dialogue," Gadamer begins an analysis of what he will later
call the logic of question and answer.

Gadamer recognizes

that what he has characterized as negative experience is a
variation on what Hegel called determinate negation.

But

Gadamer differs from Hegel insofar as he insists that
experience does not have "knowledge" as its final state-that is, the end of experience is not knowledge, and the
perfection of experience is not perfect knowledge, in which
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experience would be obviated; rather, the perfection of
experience is being perfectly experienced, and that means
being open to experience--knowing that one does not know.
To help him explicate the logical structure of the openness
to experience, Gadamer turns to Socrates.
Being open to experience--knowing that one does not
know--has the structure of a question.

We saw earlier that

for Gadamer negative experience consists in the violation or
disappointment of expectations.

The question which arose at

that point was whether Gadamer's understanding of negative
experience is naive.

Gadamer states,

We cannot have experiences without asking questions.
Recognizing that an object is different, and not as
we first thought, obviously presupposes the question
whether it was this or that. From a logical point
of view, the openness essential to experience is
precisely the openness of being either this or that.
It has the structure of a question. And just as the
dialectical negativity of experience culminates in
the idea of being perfectly experienced--i.e., being
aware of our finitude and limitedness--so also the
logical form of the question and the negativity that
is part of it culminate in a radical negativity:
the knowledge of not knowing. (362}
We might say then, that the openness characteristic of
genuine experience represents a moment of hesitation,
through which we raise a question.

~·

It represents an

intermediate stage between the steady course of old
expectations that are confirmed and the disconf irmation that
alters that course.

This hesitation indicates that we know

that we do not know, and this hesitation takes the form of a
question.

Therefore, it is not simply negative experience
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which calls our expectations into question.
It is not clear here, however, whether hesitation
precedes experience or is called forth in experience (or is
simply the "culmination" of a lifetime of experience) .

Does

one approach every experience with hesitancy, or is it only
a negative experience that calls forth hesitancy--a
hesitancy which keeps one from the precipitancy of a hasty
conclusion?
Gadamer states that "the structure of the question is
implicit in all experience.

We cannot have experiences

without asking questions" (362) .

This would seem to imply

that being open to experience means always approaching
experience with questions.

Gadamer follows up with the

claim, "Recognizing that an object is different, and not as
we first thought, obviously presupposes the question whether
it was this or that."

Recognizing an experience as

negative, as a violation, requires that one approach
experience with questions.

One could not recognize

difference if one was not open to it.

In other words, one

does not first recognize difference or violation, and then
assume the stance of the questioner.

Nor does one first

recognize difference, and then hesitate, only raising a
question as the result of such hesitation.
On one hand, then, we always bring questions to
experience:

we are always open to whether something is this

or that--we are, that is, open to alternatives.

Yet
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positive experience does not question us in turn; only
negative experience does.

This reciprocal questioning is

what makes experience genuine, and productive.

Being open

to experience means that one is oriented toward expecting
the unexpected.

What then is the point of hesitancy?

It

keeps one from being precipitant?--It allows alternatives to
come into view.
The Model of Platonic Dialogue
Being open to the negativity of genuine experience
corresponds, according to Gadamer, to the problem of asking
questions.

The great insight of the Platonic dialogues,

according to Gadamer, is that they show that it is more
difficult to ask questions than to give answers.

The

difficulty with asking questions is that one must determine
which are the right questions to ask.

Questions give a

conversation direction, so the problem is: how can one guide
the conversation in the right direction.
the right questions to ask?

How does one find

Gadamer states, "All

questioning and desire to know presuppose a knowledge that
one does not know; so much so, indeed, that a particular
lack of knowledge leads to a particular question (366) ."
Being open to what is in question means recognizing that the
answer is not settled.

The answer is questionable.

Gadamer, therefore, is not espousing "open" questions, if
"open" is taken to mean questions that are boundless.

A

question must be concretized--it must become a particular
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question.
Concretizing the question involves seeing the answer to
the question as something that is not settled, as something
that is not "decisive" (363) .

Recognizing this means

recognizing that the answer lacks something.

The goal of

questioning is to find a question which will help one make
up (at least part of) this lack.
When Gadamer takes his next step, however, he introduces
a shift:

whereas questioning presupposes .t.hat. one does not

know, the difficulty that faces the person trying to ask the
right question "lies in knowing
(366) .

~

one does not know"

If one is going to address a particular lack of

knowledge through a particular question, then one needs to
know something of what is lacking about the knowledge (the
answer) one has available.

If a question is not going to be

a floating question, but is to be concrete or particular,
then it will have to speak to the available answer.

Gadamer

continues, "Plato shows in an unforgettable way where the
difficulty lies in knowing what one does not know.

It is

the power of opinion against which it is so hard to obtain
an admission of ignorance.
questions.

It is opinion that suppresses

Opinion has a curious tendency to propagate

itself .... How, then, can ignorance be admitted and questions
arise?" (366).
Gadamer is not saying that opinion is unwilling to admit
ignorance in general, as a possibility, but rather that it
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is unwilling to admit ignorance at any particular point.
Opinion may be willing to admit the possibility of error,
but finds it difficult to identify at what point error
occurs.

It is not so much that opinion suppresses the

possibility of questions, so much as opinion suppresses the
application of any particular question.

Gadamer refers to

this as the "smooth front" of popular opinion:

There may be

many questions, but they are aligned in a front of equal
urgency; there is no way of determining which among them, if
any, is the right question to pursue.
In the face of this situation, Gadamer accounts for the
way a question arises in the following terms.
Let us say that [a question] can occur only in the
way any idea occurs to us. It is true that we do
speak of ideas occurring to us less in regard to
questions than to answers--e.g., the solution of
problems; and by this we mean to say that there is
no methodical way to arrive at the solution. But we
also know that such ideas do not occur to us
entirely uneX,Pectedly. They always presuppose an
orientation toward an area of openness from which
the idea can occur--i.e., they presuppose questions.
The real nature of the sudden idea is perhaps less
that a solution occurs to us like an answer to a
riddle than that a question occurs to us that breaks
through into the open and thereby makes an answer
possible. Every sudden idea has the structure of a
question. But the sudden occurrence of the question
is already a breach in the smooth front of popular
opinion. Hence we say that a question too "occurs"
to us, that it "arises" or "presents itself" more
than that we raise or present it" (366).
A question, then, breaks through into the open,
breaching a front.

The question overpowers the power of

opinion to suppress it.

But does the occurrence of the

question open its own critical space?

Is it "entirely

98

unexpected?"

The subtlety of Gadamer's position is worthy

of investigation.
In the passage, Gadamer compares the occurrence of a
question to the occurrence of an idea.

But, as he says, the

occurrence of an idea presupposes questions.
occurrence is not entirely unexpected.
compares an idea to a question.
of a question.

An

An

idea's

Gadamer then

idea has the structure

But if this is so, then doesn't a question

which arises in the face of opinion presuppose questions
already in play (just as an idea presupposes the area of
openness marked out by questions)?

The question which

arises presupposes other questions.

The newly-arisen

question needs the openness which questions already have
provided.

The questions already in play have provided that

openness, which makes the appearance of the new question not
entirely unexpected.
It seems possible, then, that opinion is not entirely
closed off to questioning.

It is possible that the nature

of opinion makes room for questions.

It is possible that

the nature of opinion makes it not entirely unexpected that
questions will arise.

Either that, or the questions that

are already in play have their source elsewhere.

But that

means not only that questions are always already in play,
opening spaces in opposition to opinion, but even more
importantly for this discussion it means that Gadamer has
not accounted for how ignorance is admitted and questions
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arise.

It would seem that ignorance in some sense is always

admitted and questions have already arisen.

But to tie this

back to our point of departure, this would mean that in some
sense we already know that we do not know.

But would

admitting ignorance and the existence of questions already
in play mean that we know, in some sense, what we do not
know?

In terms of Gadamer's concept of experience, would

even our opinion have experienced negation--so that it is in
some sense open, wanting to know; or, to take the other
alternative, despite our opinion, we have experienced
negation--so that we are in some way in conflict with
ourselves: the closedness of opinion being in constant
conflict with the openness of another side of ourselves (the
side which wants to know}?
Judging by what Gadamer says, he does recognize a
conflict between closedness and openness, no matter where
that conflict might be located.

He says, "there is

something peculiar about this art [of questioning] .

We have

seen that it is reserved to the person who wants to know-i .e., who already has questions.

The art of questioning is

not the art of resisting the pressure of opinion; it already
presupposes this freedom" (366} .
opinion has already been resisted.

Questioning arises because
So opinion is not

openness--it does not expect questions or challenges.
Opinion is not engaged in the search to know.
continues on the next page:

Gadamer

"As the art of asking
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questions, dialectic proves its value because only the
person who knows how to ask questions is able to persist in
his questioning, which involves being able to preserve his
orientation toward openness" (367) .

Opinion, then, is that

which threatens to overcome questioning.

But the freedom to

resist this threat--that resists this threat--is always
presupposed by questioning.

Only if we do not persist in

questioning does the freedom to question become concealed.
However, Gadamer suggests that such persistence is not
an easy matter.

In fact, it is quite difficult, for he says

that "only the person who knows how to ask questions is able
to persist ... "
we began:

But that is precisely the problem with which

how does one determine the right questions?

Here

it is no longer sufficient to say that, "A person skilled in
the 'art' of questioning is a person who can prevent
questions from being suppressed by the dominant opinion"
(367) .

Prevention of suppression is a rather weak indicator

of one's knowledge of the art of questioning.

In fact,

there is a circularity here, insofar as Gadamer states that
only the one who knows how to ask questions will persist,
and yet the proof of that knowledge is in the persistence of
questioning in the face of suppression.

For Gadamer this

circularity is not vicious, but rather hermeneutic, and it
is inherent in all experience:

only by being open will we

truly experience; but, given our situatedness within a
tradition that constitutes the medium of our experience, it
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is only by experiencing (interpreting, applying), that we
attain openness toward possibilities.
How then, does questioning proceed?

In this context

Gadamer affirms, as a condition for genuine dialogue, the
requirement that the real strength of the other person's
position must be brought out.

He says

To conduct a conversation means to allow oneself to
be conducted by the subject matter to which the
partners in the dialogue are oriented. It requires
that one does not try to argue the other person down
but that one really considers the weight of the
other's opinion ...... A person who possesses this art
[of questioning] will himself search for everything
in favor of an opinion. Dialectic consists not in
trying to discover the weakness of what is said, but
in bringing out its real strength. (367)
Bringing out the real strength of the other's position
proceeds by means of a process which legitimates and then
limits.

In other words, one seeks to discover and

acknowledge the truth and power of the other's position, but
then correspondingly delimits the scope and depth of its
applications.

Both movements are part of the determination

of "real strength."

Delimitation, in fact, is the

determination of the question to which the position is an
answer--a determination of the question that this answer i.a
"in a position" to answer.
Summa:ry
It may seem odd that Popper and Gadamer would agree that
genuine criticism (or dialogue) requires one to bring out
the strengths of the other's position, and yet draw such
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very different conclusions about the implications of this
requirement for the possibility of revolution.

It would

seem less odd if one were to take note of the fact that
Gadamer also sees little promise in the idea of progress.
The limits of the applicability of Gadamer's hermeneutics to
Kuhn's philosophy of science may be reached when one runs up
against this idea.

As we have seen throughout this paper,

the entire issue of the complementarity of tradition and
revolution is deeply vested in the issue of progress.

For

Popper, scientific advance is achieved through perpetual
revolutions.

Kuhn himself claims that his understanding of

scientific revolutions is not meant to imply that no claim
to progress can be made.

Gadamer, on the other hand,

warrants no such deployment of the idea of progress.

At

best tradition is reformed and restored, and parochial
prejudices are overcome.

Experience is not progressive, and

none of its achievements warrants the name "progress."

The

truth that is appropriated through the critical reception of
tradition must be won anew by each generation.

There is,

says Gadamer, no progress, but only participation (Gadamer
1986:6).

One must turn to Hans Blumenberg to find a hermeneutic
philosophy that makes room for the idea of progress (though
as we shall see, it is "relative" progress:
relative to preceding problems) .

progress

His position, we will see,

denies that every overcoming of connnunication breakdown is
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ultimately only a restoration and reconfirmation of
tradition, a shedding away of parochial prejudices by means
of their engagement through dialogue.

CHAPTER FIVE
BLUMENBERG'S DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS
The last chapter ended at the point where Gadamer
affirmed, as a condition for genuine dialogue, the
requirement that the real strength of what the other has
said must be brought out.

Only when interlocutors do not

focus simply on exposing weaknesses, but instead give due
weight to the strengths of each other's opinion--that is,
enter into a genuine conversation--can a conversation be
properly led by, and oriented to, the matter at issue (.die.
Sache) handed down by tradition.

The question which will be

addressed by the end of this chapter, however, is:

does the

satisfaction of this requirement actually suppress crises
and revolutions? 1
Hans Blumenberg develops Gadamer's philosophical
hermeneutics, I will argue, in the direction of its
possibilities for underwriting the concepts of crisis and

As we shall see, the "suppression" spoken of here
does not only pertain to the present--i.e., the suppression
of our own revolutionary or critical impulses--but also
pertains to the past: do we, as participants in a
Gadamerian conversation, suppress our openness to
revolutiona:r:y phenomena of the past, that is, our openness
to contrary, dissident voices? Do we perhaps even fail to
hear the revolutionary, or emancipatory, claims of the
voices we do attend to?
1
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revolution.

To support this claim, I will begin the chapter

by exploring the one facet of Gadamer's position that seems
to open the space for the kind of operation that is required
for revolutionary claims--namely, his understanding of the
"classical."

In short, I will forge a link between

Gadamer's description of the operations of the classic text
and Blumenberg's description of the operations of a
revolutionary text.
Gadamer's concept of the classical, however, has been
subjected to much criticism.

Insofar as Gadamer's idea of

the classic seems to foster the image of tradition as "a
self-activating movement of imperishable substances" (Jauss
1982:64), his position can easily be understood as one which
makes us ideological supporters of traditions and texts. 2
The superiority of the classic consists in its privileged
relationship to the matter at issue, on the basis of which
privilege it can elicit this matter into presence directly
before us.

Gadamer's position leaves us with little choice,

according to this criticism, but to submit to such a
superior power of access. 3
2

Concerning the ideologcal nature of Gadamer's
position, see Habermas's "Review of Gadamer's Truth and
Method" (1990:213-241), and Karl-Otto Apel, Towards a
Transformation of Philosophy (1980) .
Note the parallels between this criticism of
Gadamer and that levelled by Popper at Kuhn:
The 'normal' scientist, in my view, has been
taught badly. I believe, and so do many others,
that all teaching on the University level (and if
possible below} should be training and
3
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Whether these criticisms are justified or not, I will
argue that Blumenberg's position develops Gadamer's
hermeneutics in a direction which can avoid them, while
simultaneously affirming the intuitions Gadamer expresses
about the operations of the classic.

This development,

furthermore, makes way for the deployment of the concept of
theoretical revolution, which can support and strengthen the
Kuhnian conception of revolution.
Gadamer's Understanding of the Classical
In the section of Truth

gnd

Method in which he analyzes

the "Example of the Classical" (Gadamer 1990, 285-90), one
gets a glimpse of what Gadamer means by the historical
nature of understanding.

He states, "We might say that the

classical is a truly historical category, precisely because
it is more than a concept of a period or of a historical
style, and yet it nevertheless does not try to be the
concept of a suprahistorical value" (287) .

In speaking of

the classical, one must avoid the two extremes of reducing
it merely to a style characteristic of a period of history,
or of projecting it into a "supra-historical" realm.
Between these extremes lies Gadamer's understanding of the
essence of the historical.
encouragement in critical thinking. The 'normal'
scientist, as described by Kuhn, has been badly
taught. He has been taught in a dogmatic spirit:
he is a victim of indoctrination. (Popper 1970:523)
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[The classical] does not refer to a quality that
we ascribe to particular historical phenomena but
to a notable mode of being historical: the
historical process of preservation that, through
constantly proving itself, allows something true
to come into being. It is not at all the case, as
the historical mode of thought would have us
believe, that the value judgment which accords
something the status of a classic was in fact
destroyed by historical reflection and its
criticism of all teleological construals of the
process of history. Rather, through this
criticism the value judgment implicit in the
concept of the classical acquires a new, special
legitimacy. The classical is something that
resists historical criticism because its
historical dominion, the binding power of the
validity that is preserved and handed down,
precedes all historical reflection and continues
in it. (287)
The qualitative judgment which describes a text as being
"classic" does not identify a suprahistorical quality that
surpasses ore escapes its historical mode of being.

Neither

does this judgment restrict the "classic" to an expression
of a particular historical period or style.

Instead, the

"classic" refers to a historical "process of preservation"
in which the text retains the "binding power of its
validity" through the movement of history.

The power of the

historicist critique was that it undermined the dogma of
suprahistorical values.

Its weakness, however, was that it

reduced all valuations to the historical concepts of
"period" and "style."
Gadamer is not a traditional historicist, although
he maintains the importance of the mode of being historical.
For him, the qualitative judgment which describes a text as
"classic" recognizes that, precisely through the historical
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process and

ge.

a historical phenomenon, the "classic"

presents itself to consciousness as "something enduring,"
which "preserves itself precisely because it is significant
in itself and interprets itself"--"it says something to the
present as if it were said specifically to it."

The text

presents a "signficance that cannot be lost and that is
independent of all the circumstances of time--a kind of
timeless present that is contemporaneous with every other
present."

Gadamer goes so far as to say that, "the

classical, then, is certainly something 'timeless,' but this
timelessness is a mode of historical being" (288, 290).
Gadamer is struggling to articulate a position
between the alternatives of the
"historicist." 4

11

suprahistorical 11 and the

To that end he uses language borrowed from

the tradition of each, even when it leads to paradoxical
formulations or prima facie contradictions.

Only by

recognizing his struggle can one attempt to understand a
The term "historicist" means something different
for Gadamer than it does for Popper. By "historicism"
Gadamer understands the tradition represented by someone
like Dilthey, for whom the task of historical understanding
would involve the recovery or reconstruction of the original
life-world of a particular historical agent, having as its
aim understanding that agent as she understood herself. As
I suggested in the last chapter, the self-transposition that
is required by this task arises from the attempt to overcome
our foreignness with respect to the past. The negation of
temporal distance, which the accomplishment of this task
implies, follows upon the negative evaluation of such
distance as being only an obstacle to understanding. A
central feature of Gadamer's hermeneutics (a feature he
shares with Kuhn, as I pointed out earlier) is the
affirmation of temporal distance as a condition enabling
understanding, not simply blocking it.
4
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statement like, "timelessness is a mode of historical
being," as being something other than nonsense.
The complexity of his struggle is indicated by the
use he makes of the concept of the "world" of the classical
and our "belonging" to it (290) . In positing the classical
phenomenon as being historical, Gadamer fights against the
historicist tendency (characteristic of Dilthey) to reduce
the understanding of that phenomenon to the reconstruction
of a past world.

"Our understanding, " he states, "will

always retain the consciousness that we too belong to that
world, and correlatively, that the work too belongs to our
world" (290) .

Because Gadamer wants to recognize the

"constitutive" character of the historical without being
historicist, and simultaneously recognize the "timelessness"
of the classical without resorting to the suprahistorical,
he interprets the "world" of the classical in a manner which
permits the needed elements of each extreme to function
together--specifically, the "process-like" character of the
historical and the "self-preserving" character of the
suprahistorical are conjoined in our recognition of the
"classical" world.

This "world" is subject to historical

processes, and yet is preserved in its historical mode of
being, such that this world is also "our" world.

The

classical proves itself through a process of preservation
that "speaks directly" to past and present "worlds."
fact, this power to speak directly is "fundamentally

In
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unlimited" (290) .
This exposition of Gadamer's position may be
misleading, however, insofar as the stress has been placed
too heavily on the "objective" side of the problem.

"World"

should not be understood as an "object"--especially as a
"historical object" for historical consciousness. 5

Such an

understanding would lead back once more to either the
suprahistorical extreme or the historicist extreme, each of
which Gadamer wants to avoid.

To that extent, both the

suprahistorical and the historicist positions stem from a
corrunon objectivism.

Central to Gadamer's struggle to avoid

this objectivism is the idea of "belonging."
He says, for example, that "cultural consciousness
manifests an ultimate corrununity and sharing with the world
from which a classical work speaks" (290) .

This world, for

consciousness, is something in which we "share" and with
which we are in "corrununity."
object over against us.

It is not first of all an

The world is carried along with the

work, and the work opens its world before it.

We belong to

that world just as the work belongs to our world.

The

historical movement which constitutes "belonging," in fact,
characterizes understanding itself.

"Understanding is to be

thought of less as a subjective act than as participating in
To understand the world as an "object" is a
symptom, in Gadamer's mind, of the objectivism
characteristic of the Enlightenment. For additional
corrunents, the reader is referred back to the introduction of
Gadamer's hermeneutics at the beginning of Chapter Three.
5
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an event of tradition, a process of transmission in which
past and present are constantly mediated" (290) .
Understanding participates and

shares in a process of

transmission--it is neither the intuition of a
suprahistorical realm nor the objective delineation of
unique historical periods.

Both alternatives rest upon the

supposition of human nature as an "unhistorical substratum."
Therefore, not only does the classic refer to a "notable
mode of being historical," but human nature itself refers to
a "notable mode of being historical" (287).

Both the

classic and the human stand between the suprahistorical and
historicist extremes.
This, then, gives one some idea of what Gadamer
means by the idea of "belonging."

The classic text, its

world, our world, we ourselves belong to a tradition--a
process of transmission in which each of these elements is
constantly "mediated."

This idea of "mediation" tempers the

power of a text to "speak directly."

Attributing such power

to a text may lead to the misunderstandings of the
suprahistorical extreme.

The classic text may speak

directly to our world because it belongs to our world-because it belongs to a process of transmission in which our
world also shares and participates.

But the "voice" of the

text must be mediated for our understanding through the
activity of our understanding.
understanding is not passive.

In other words, our
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In this regard Gadamer appeals to the "hermeneutic
circle."

In the hermeneutic circle, our understanding is

active in anticipating the meaning of the text.

Such

anticipations, however, do not originate in an activity of
subjectivity, but rather proceed "from the conunonality that
binds us to the tradition" (293} .

The anticipatory activity

of understanding, therefore, is a projection of meaning--but
such projection is grounded upon the appropriation of the
possibilities inherent within the tradition.

In short, our

understanding both appropriates meanings from the tradition
and projects meanings upon the traditionary text.

In so

doing, our understanding "participate[s] in the evolution of
tradition, and hence further determine[s] it" (293}.

For

Gadamer, then, tradition is not a "permanent precondition,"
but is a process of transmission in which we participate and
which we produce.
Problems with Gadamer•s Model of the Classical
Critics such as Hans Robert Jauss (1982} have
identified two main problems with Gadamer's concept of the
classical:

First, on this understanding of the classic, it

would seem that the address the classic text makes to us
stands outside of the logic of question and answer that
Gadamer is at such pains to demonstrate.

The classic text

would be different from other texts insofar as the
interpreter would not need to "seek" the question to which
the text itself is the answer--the question would seem to
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have always already delivered and validated itself as a
matter with which we should be concerned.

Second, this

understanding of the classic conflicts with his own
conception of the role of effective history in
understanding.

Specifically, in so elevating the status of

the classic, does not Gadamer undermine the tension--that
is, the temporal distance 6 --between the text and the
present that he affirms for the relationship of every other
text to a present? (Jauss 1982:29-32)
Gadamer's possible response might begin by rejecting
the suggestion that, in appropriating the classic, we turn
directly to it for answers to our questions.

Not only is

Gadamer sensitive to questions of anachronism (reading
things back into the past in order to make that past seem
less foreign) and distortion (ripping the text out of its
historical horizon so that it may be free to speak to us),
he is also not suggesting that our relationship to any text
--classic or traditionary--is primarily "therapeutic. 111

If

the classic still has something to say to us, then its

6

We saw earlier that Gadamer considers temporal
distance to be not merely an obstacle to understanding (and
a cause of communication breakdown), but an enabling
condition. The peculiar nature of temporal distance
therefore makes it a productive ground for understanding.
The criticism forwarded here is that Gadamer is forsaking
the productivity for understanding of a tension he affirms
elsewhere.
By "therapeutic" I mean the suggestion that a
classic serves us best when it aids us in treating the
questions that trouble us.
1
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claims do not simply provide answers to our questions.

When

Gadamer says that the classical says something to us as if
it were said specifically to us, he is not suggesting that
the classic text speaks directly to our questions.

In a

sense, our questions are inappropriate if we use them as the
means to directly hear the classic text in the claim it
wants to make (although one should keep in mind here
Gadamer's analysis of "prejudice").

Therefore, the

"classic" status of a text is not definable as: "the text's
ability to speak directly and meaningfully to our presentday questions and concerns."

The classic is no more capable

of this than is any traditionary text.

What, then, is the

classic status of the text?
A classic text is a text which consistently
demonstrates its power to question us directly.

The

classic, I would suggest, can even overpower its effective
history insofar as that effective history stands between us
and the text.

The classical, then, is different from

traditionary texts insofar as it operates despite the
operations of its effective history.
the present.

It speaks directly to

The classic breaks down effective history's

grip upon us (although that operation is itself a reaffirmation of the text's effectivity, and thus its
effective history) .
If this is the way that Gadamer can be understood,
however, then other questions begin to arise.

Specifically,
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it begins to appear that Gadamer is claiming that a classic
text uproots us from our own concerns and forces its own
claims upon us--our response to which can only be
submission.

It is a provocation to which we must respond. 8

The classic text, it would seem, enjoys its own relationship
to truth, which may generate a revolutionary response on our
part.

In breaking down tradition, the classic is actually

breaking down that which first conditions our cares and
concerns about what matters (die Sache) .
Gadamer himself would probably be more comfortable with
a somewhat weaker claim:

what actually occurs is that the

classic text "delivers" die Sache--the matter at issue--to
us.

Nevertheless, rather than participating with us in a

dialogue led by what is at issue, on this reading the
classic text would demonstrate its superiority and power by
this capacity to elicit die Sache into presence.
to account for this power?

How are we

How is this power of delivery

compatible with the other aspects of Gadamer's hermeneutics:
those which, for example, stress the process of dialogue and
mediation?

On this reading our understanding of the classic

achieves a mediation that has not been required to suffer

This description of the operations of a classic
text bears a striking similarity to Popper's reference to
the "problem" that conditions our revolutionary conjectures.
The similarity to Kuhn is not nearly as striking: Kuhn's
reference to normal science generating "anomalies" that may
provoke crisis and revolutionary responses is comparable,
but, as we shall see, it is more compatible with
Blumenberg's position.
8
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the pains of the process--although it was precisely this
which is demanded of Popper!
Does Gadamer threaten the integrity of his own
hermeneutics?

It may very well be that he has introduced an

unnecessary tension between two claims that, from another
perspective, are more compatible than may immediately be
realized.

If Gadamer has distinguished too cleanly between

the operations of classical texts and those of traditionary
texts (1990:577), then it may be because the threat he
perceives is the kind of historicism that makes them
indistinguishable once more.
Hans Blumenberg's work, I suggest, offers a remedy to
this unnecessary tension.

His position distinguishes

between a classic and a traditionary text insofar as the
former can provoke a revolutionary response, whereas merely
traditionary texts provoke responses that fall within the
parameters of "normal" research (either scientific or
interpretive) . 9

However, our understanding of both kinds

Hannah Arendt makes a similar claim in Qn
Revolution (1990) [I will discuss other overlaps between
Arendt and Blumenberg later in this chapter] . Note David
Ingram's interpretation of Arendt's claim:
If ... we look to the past of a particular culture
for guidance, it is a past that, in the words of
Arendt, exemplifies something universal. This
timeless past can be invoked by revolutionaries to
liberate the present from an oppressive and
parochial past. (Ingram 1995: 357)
9

Arendt herself speaks at one point of the "definite, though
undefined" past to which the American revolutionary Thomas
Paine appealed as authorizing "revolution" (1990:45).
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of text still requires the operation of the logic of
question and answer.

How does Blumenberg carry this out?

We can forward two versions--a strong and a weak--of
Blumenberg's general claim, in terms still very close to
those of Gadamer, in order to get a sense of his development
of this issue.

The strong version would say that it is not

that Plato, for example, speaks to us only through, or as
conditioned by, tradition, but also speaks despite the
tradition that normally mediates our understanding.

The

weaker version would suggest that Plato can still take a
meaningful stance within the context of die Sache, a stance
that is not simply a repetition of what we have already
taken him to say.

Said more positively:

we can still

discover an element in Plato that wants to say something
over and above what the tradition has already taken him to
have said.

Both versions express the claim that Plato can

speak to us despite tradition, but with important
differences.
For Blumenberg, the undiscovered element in Plato is
not a case of surplus meaning, unless we mean by that only
that Plato remains a conversation partner whose position is
never wholly taken up into, nor rejected from, our own.

He

remains a conversation partner who opposes us, yet opposes
under the guidance of a matter at issue in which we too
"participate".

Plato therefore challenges our understanding

of the issue--and the more he challenges the more he
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undermines, deflects, and transforms his own effective
history (which itself has conditioned our understanding both
of the issue and of his position on the issue) .
This way of stating things is noteworthy if for no
other reason than it points out the "negative" aspect of
tradition and effective history. 10

Effective history can

stand between us and the claims of die Sache as much as
enable us to hear that claim. 11

Similarly, when Gadamer

claims that we are not emancipated from effective history
simply by being made conscious of it, that does not mean
that "emancipation" is thereby excluded from Gadamer's
lexicon (Gadamer 1976:34).

In light of Gadamer's

appreciation for the negativity of experience, it may be
more accurate to say that tradition is at least as much a
handing down of falsified understanding as it is a handing
down of beliefs we would like to confirm.

Some interpreters have portrayed Gadamer as having
an exclusively, or at least excessively, rosy picture of
tradition. But the aspects which indicate that effective
history is sometimes operated against--even if it is not a
condition from which we could be totally emancipated--point
to a more balanced view of Gadamer. If Gadamer can be
credited with a rehabilitation of effective history, this
should not be taken to mean that the enabling function of
effective history for understanding is now its exclusive
function. An exclusively "enabling" function too easily
legitimates an "appreciation" for the past that could so
"charm" or "captivate" us that we quickly find ourselves
submitting to the concerns of that past. {Although Gadamer
does use these terms (1990:490).
10

As Paul Ricoeur points out in "The Hermeneutical
Function of Distanciation (1973), some critical distance is
required.
11
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There is then, in all of this, a considerable overlap
between Blumenberg and Gadamer.

Blumenberg does not so much

oppose Gadamer as develop aspects of his position12 - particularly those which are required for his answer to the
question:

how is the matter elicited by the classic text

validated as a matter with which we too should be concerned?
Specifically, Blumenberg develops the logic of question and
answer (provocation/response) through two means:

the

concept of "reoccupation" (Umbesetzung)--which I will
introduce in the next section--and the claim that the
history of what led up to an event conditions the history of
its effects (Vorgeschichte conditions Wirkungsgeschichte) .
The Logic of Question and Answer as
a Process of Reoccupation
Blumenberg's concept of "reoccupation," I suggest,
should be understood as the result of applying the model of
dialogue to historiography.

Gadamer's understanding of the

logic of question and answer has, as a fundamental
principle, the idea that due weight should be given to the

Although mention should be made of their "debate"
over Blumenberg's critique of the secularization thesis in
The Legitimacy of the Modern Age. See Gadamer's review in
Philosophische Rundschau 15 (1968), 201-209. Blumenberg's
response has been incorporated into the latest English
translation of Legitimacy (1983) .
In addition, as I shall point out in more detail
shortly, in Work on Myth (1985), Blumenberg relates
favorably to the "aesthetic of reception" of Hans Robert
Jauss, a student of Gadamer's. In The Genesis of the
CQPernican World (1987), Blumenberg puts tremendous emphasis
on the idea of "reception."
12
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strengths of another's position.

"Reoccupation" is deployed

to account for the consequences for inquiry when inquiry
attempts to abide by this dialogical principle.

What does

Blumenberg mean by reoccupation?
All change, all succession from old to new,
is accessible to us only in that it can be
related--instead of to the "substance" of which
Kant speaks--to a constant frame of reference, by
whose means the requirements can be defined that
have to be satisfied in an identical "position."
That what is new in history cannot be arbitrary in
each case, but rather is subject to a rigor of
expectations and needs, is the condition of our
being able to have such a thing as "cognition" of
history at all. The concept of "reoccupation"
designates, by implication, the minimum of
identity that it must be possible to discover, or
at least to presuppose and to search for, in even
the most agitated movement of history. In the
case of systems of "notions of man and world"
(Welt- und Menschenansicht: Goethe),
"reoccupation" means that different statements can
be understood as answers to identical questions.
(Blumenberg 1983, 466)
So reoccupation is first and foremost a category of
continuity--the attempt to discover a minimum of
identity . 13

This identity, furthermore, is to be

understood in terms of the relationship between question and
answer--that is, dialogically.

What is new in history is

subject to a rigor of expectations--that is, it must be
understood as an answer to a particular question.
It is instructive for our purposes to note that when
Blumenberg first uses the term "reoccupation" in The
Recall Blumenberg's critique of Kuhn's concept of
"scientific revolution," mentioned in Chapter One
(Blumenberg 1983:465). "Reoccupation" is intended to
fulfill the requirements Blumenberg demands of Kuhn.
13

121
Legitimacy of the Modern Age, he opposes it to the idea of
"transposition" that is at the heart of the secularization
theory of Karl Lowith.
What mainly occurred in the process that is
interpreted as secularization, at least (so far)
in all but a few recognizable and specific
instances, should be described not as the
transposition [Umsetzung] of authentically
theological contents into secularized alienation
from their origin but rather as the reoccupation
[UTI!besetzung] of answer positions that had become
vacant and whose corresponding questions could not
be eliminated. (Blumenberg 1983, 65)
One should note that Blumenberg does not use the word
Versetzung [displacement] to make his claim.

Displacement

is not flexible enough to bear the nuance Blumenberg
intends, since it too exclusively implies "supplanting" or
"actively removing."

This is not to say, however, that

UTI!besetzung does not carry a sense of "displacement," for it
can also be translated as "reshuffling."

The deployment of

the term "UTI!besetzung", I would suggest, is intentionally
ambiguous.

Blumenberg plays of the dual sense of

reoccupation and reshuffling.

"Reoccupation" implies the

satisfaction of obligations that are imposed upon us--a
"problem-pressure," as he puts it, from which we cannot
simply escape (Blumenberg 1983:48, 64ff).

"Reshuffling," on

the other hand, implies activity on the part of the
recipient of such questions.
The operations of this duality can be understood better
by linking them up to our earlier problem:
of the classic text.

the operations

What Blumenberg's position suggests is
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that the operations of such a classic text can be
differentiated depending upon from which of two perspectives
those operations are approached.

One perspective would

understand the operations of the classic as that which
perpetually overwhelms and displaces our concerns by means
of a claim upon what should be our "real" concerns.

The

second perspective would understand the operations of the
classic as that which perpetually proves itself capable of
speaking to our concerns (i.e., to the particular problems
the tradition faces in its understanding of die Sache) .

The

operations of the classic, then, will be variably evaluated,
given the difference between these perspectives.
What the concept of Umbesetzung allows us to see, is
that the operations concealed by one perspective are
revealed by the other:

From the perspective that sees the

classic text primarily as an innovative claim that disrupts
our concerns, and attempts to replace these concerns with
its own determination of what is--or should properly be--at
issue, what gets concealed is the way that such disruptions
(Popperian conjectures) may actually contribute to a
proliferation of questions, rather than an amputation of
questions that would allow easy access to the matter at
issue.

Such proliferation :mgy actually serve to block

access rather than guarantee it.

From the perspective that

sees the classic text primarily as a pre-eminent
traditionary text, on the other hand, the uncovering of a
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hitherto unsuspected element of substantive meaning--which
thereby contributes to the totality of its effective
history--conceals the "shift" that Blumenberg calls
"Urnbesetzung."

Particular questions--some of which were

raised only because the text was supposed to have been
capable of being applied to them, and thus of answering
them--are reoccupied with new answers.

What gives the

appearance of a continuity in content is actually a
continuity in the framework of answer positions.
When the classic text is seen primarily as disruptive
of our concerns--as revolutionary--then it is easy to think
of Urnbesetzung as simply a displacement of one set of
concerns by another set which now claims to be that which
should occupy us.
place?

But how can such a displacement take

Does the classic miraculously produce these new

concerns like a magician pulls a rabbit out of a hat?

What

would create the conditions for our "enchantment" here? 14
On the other hand, when the classic text is seen
primarily as speaking directly to us in our concerns--as
pre-eminent in our tradition--then the "preservation" of
these concerns of ours by means of the classic's operations
can too easily be understood--if it involves any change at
all--as at most a transformation, modification, or

The term "enchantment" is taken from Georgia
Warnke's critique of Gadamer's concept of the classical.
Gadamer: Hermeneutics. Tradition and Reason (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1987), 106.
14
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development in content, motivated by the acknowledgement and
appropriation of the new claims.

But at this point appear

the two threats I mentioned earlier, which both arise from
the failure to be sufficiently critical of our standards for
concern:

anachronism and distortion.

With the idea of "Umbesetzung," Blumenberg is
attempting to overcome the weaknesses of both of these
positions.

In so doing, he draws our attention to the

determinations we have made about our concerns--that is, to
the answers we have given to the questions that concern us.
Questions do not always precede their answers, says
Blumenberg.
We are going to have to free ourselves from the
idea that there is a firm canon of the "great
questions" that throughout history and with an
unchanging urgency have occupied human curiosity
and motivated the pretension to world and selfinterpretation. Such a canon would explain the
changing systems of mythology, theology, and
philosophy by the congruence of their output of
assertions with its content of questions. (65-6)
Blumenberg's comment suggests that we should not always
be led by the approach which evaluates answers only as
alternative to a particular question.
should not simply ask:
question?

In other words, we

which answer is better to this

We sometimes need to ask:

this answer function as an answer?

to what question does
If the claim made by the

answer is to be preserved, it will be preserved only insofar
as it functions as an answer to a question--or, can still
function as an answer to a question.
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The idea Blumenberg is driving at, then, is that an
answer position within a framework of questions may be
"preserved," but now it is understood "better":

it may now

be seen to serve a different function within the interplay
of questions than it was understood to have served; and its
answer may serve as an answer to a different question, or
serve a different application.
In short, the issue with which we understood a text to
be concerned--the issue concerning which the claims of the
text were made--can receive a new determination, insofar as
the answer the text is understood to be providing itself can
receive a new determination.

It can thus be with a

fundamentally new interplay of issues that the text is seen
as being concerned.
Sunnnary
Insofar as the purpose of this section was only to
introduce Blumenberg's concept of "Umbesetzung" as a
development of the logic of question and answer, these last
connnents should be understood as anticipations.

The purpose

of Blumenberg•s development of the logic of question and
answer, which has not yet been achieved, is to answer how
the matter at issue elicited by the classic text could be
validated as a matter with which we also are/should be
concerned.

To this point, the dual sense of Umbesetzung as

reoccupation/reshuffling has been highlighted, a duality
which attempts to forge a path between the two
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understandings of the operation of the classical from which
both Gadamer and Blumenberg want to distance themselves.
The prima:r:y purpose for which the concept of Umbesetzung is
deployed--to account for the consequences for inquiry when
inquiry attempts to abide by the dialogical principle that
due weight should be given to the strengths of the other's
position--still needs to be explained.

Thus far, only its

function in identifying the continuity of answer positions
has been considered.

Only after the next section can the

concept be developed fully.
The History of What Led to a Text's Appearance
Conditions the Histo:r:y of Its Effects
The title of this section can be re-stated as: Prehistory Cvorgeschichte) Conditions Effective History
{Wirkungsgeschichte) .

This is a central claim made by

Blumenberg, and it needs to be understood in conjunction
with the idea of reoccupation.

The upshot of the last

section was that a classic text can be revolutionary--as
long as the claims it makes fill {reoccupy) the positions of
the questions {and answers) it disrupts.

In other words,

even a revolutionary text does not simply, or
straightforwardly "disrupt."

It does not generate, or self-

activate, its own, authoritative, effective history.

There

are conditions for such disruptions--conditions for the
possibility of the text's reception, of the text's effects.
Blumenberg's claim is that the history of what leads up to a
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text's reception conditions its effects.
The phrase is itself taken from the title of one of the
chapters of Blumenberg's book, The Genesis of the Copernican
World (1987) .

Blumenberg states the nature of his concern:

My objective was to show that in the history of
philosophical thought and of its role in the
foundation of modern science it cannot only be a
matter of presenting the derivation and
development of particular ideas and hypotheses,
and of bringing to light what stimulated them, and
their early forms. Instead, we need to begin one
level lower, with the origin of the scope or
latitude in which those new conceptions first
became possible at all, and within which both the
affinities that gave them an effect and the means
by which to formulate them arose. (my stress)
(Blumenberg, 1987: 167)
Blumenberg is here challenging the hegemony of "histories of
influence," which attempt to narrativize the origin and
development of particular theories by searching for
prototypes and forerunners whose ideas often "take hold" in
dramatic--though for that very reason often inexplicable-fashion.

These same narratives also search for the

appearance of key words or names, and take these appearances
as evidence of "effects" justifying the continuation of the
narrative.

Blumenberg's logic of question and answer

rejects the idea that a narrative of how theories are
generated and "progress" is sufficient.

He claims that his

own approach
... does not answer the question as to how the
Copernican system arose. It only removes the
isolation of that issue from the preconditions of
the fact that Copernicus did not become the
Aristarchus of the sixteenth century, a thinker
without any effect. (167)
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It is understanding precisely .thi..s. lack of effect which is
central to Blumenberg's concerns.
Our subject is ..... the conditions of the
possibility of the fact that there is any such
thing as a history of Copernicus's effects--which
is by no means a matter of course, since there had
not been such a history in the case of Aristarchus
of Samos.
(131)
The task is to identify the background conditions
of the assurance that enabled Copernicus to have
any expectation at all that his readers would
consent to the work's full claim to truth ..... How
could he, for his part, avoid his forerunners' and
predecessors' manifest failure of encountering an
audience that is not only uncomprehending but
committed to incompatible assumptions? (128)
First and foremost the claim that pre-history
conditions effective history affirms the importance of the
logic of question and answer for our understanding of texts
--particularly "classic," or "revolutionary" texts.

By

means of this phrase, Blumenberg suggests that a classic
text does not respond only to a determinate set of problems,
but in fact responds also to a broader horizon of
expectations. 15

The classic text operates both upon the

determinate questions to which it responds, and the horizon
of expectations to which it brings its own claims.

In a way

that still needs to be explained, it is by these means that
the text serves not only as a source of answers, but also as
a source of new questions--which constitute its effects.
It is important to note at this point that these new
This horizon of expectations relates to what was
earlier called the "strength" of the other's position--what
Popper calls "the real power of a theory."
15
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questions do not just open "in front" of the text.

The

classic text opens up questions both in front of itself and
behind itself.

The pre-history of a text, then, conditions

what that text opens both in front of itself and behind
itself.

Pre-history does not just condition the effects the

text may have on the future--it does not just condition the
questions it directs to the future.

It also conditions the

effects the text may have in opening new insights into the
past--that is, in directing new questions at the past, or to
the past, or even in opening a conversation with voices of
the past that have been silent (or silenced) . 16

The

effective history of a text, then, in a sense operates
forward and backward.

It not only opens a future for us

through the questions it directs to us, but also opens the
past (for us as well) through the questions it directs to
us.
The matter at issue which the text thus elicits into
presence is a fundamentally "new" matter, not only (or even
Parallels to numerous thinkers present themselves
here. For example, this aspect of Blumenberg's position
(and, in fact, much of the entire idea of reoccupation) is
shared with Arendt: emancipation can operate
retrospectively. The insights mentioned here do not need to
be so dramatic, of course. Paul Ricoeur, referring both to
Jauss and (somewhat more indirectly) to Blumenberg, provides
another kind of example:
16

It is after the fact, by a recoil-effect of
Mallarme's lyrical hermeticism, that we are able
to release virtual meanings in baroque poetry that
had hitherto remained unnoticed. (Ricoeur
1988:172)
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primarily) because it is directed to our age, but because it
opens its own age and previous ages to us in new ways--i.e.,
raises new questions that can be directed at that age.
What is accomplished, then, is a renewal of the
concerns of the past--but not in the sense that these
concerns are directly validated for us; rather, these
concerns are raised as questions for us, in the sense that
they are not something from which we can simply "break" or
move forward, because we are not clear about what it is from
which we are distinguishing ourselves.

We cannot "surpass"

it unless and until we know what it is that is being
"surpassed."

In this sense, then, "crisis" is not a

"conflict" of interpretations, since we are not sure that
there is a conflict.

Crisis is not definable as dispute

between two clearly identifiable opponents--it is a lack of
definition and clarity which represents the crisis.

Crisis

does not begin when problems receive more precise
definition, but rather when such definition is lacking.
Blumenberg speaks of the context of crisis in terms of
a "latitude in variation":
To speak, in the history of science, of a
"latitude" for possible changes means to determine
the breadth of variation within which certain
theoretical actions are possible and others are
excluded. The narrowness or broadness of this
enclave of the possible inside the occupied
territory of supposed necessities, with the
restraint or the freedom that it imposes on or
grants to intellectual motions, is determined by
the stability or instability of the system of
world-explanation in which it inheres. (my stress)
(132)
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To link this up with the idea of a text's effects, we can
say that the conditions of the possibility of a classic or
revolutionary text opening up the future (and the past)
consist of the stability or instability of the system within
which variations are tolerated.

It is here that Blumenberg

finds some common ground with Kuhn.
The theory of 'scientific revolutions' describes,
for the most part correctly, the breakdown of
dominant systems as a result of their immanent
rigorism, the 'pedantic' disposition of every
schoollike mode of thought, which leads with
fateful inevitability to the self-uncovering of
the marginal inconsistencies from which doubt and
opposition break into the consolidated field.
(Blumenberg, 1983:467).
It is not just the weaknesses identifiable within a theory
which constitute the latitude of variation possible, but
also the possibility of opening new questions about the
strengths of the theory.

But this possibility of calling

the strengths of the theory into question is not one which
only an opponent of the theory would exploit.

This

possibility is also--even first--exploited by defenders of
the theory--perhaps especially when the weaknesses of the
theory have been revealed.

Opening new questions about the

strength of the theory--the possibilities of its
applications--can for a considerable length of time be a
common aim of both "dogmatists" and

11

critics.

11

Both

dogmatists and revolutionaries open new questions about the
strength of the theory.

Both must expect the theory to be

capable of such applications, of such extensions, if these
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questions are to be truly motivated (i.e., asked in good
faith)--it is not always easy, or at all times possible, to
distinguish the dogmatist from the revolutionary, a defender
from an attacker. 17
The concept of U1Pbesetzung, then, is deployed by
Blumenberg to account for the burdens we accept and the
strategies we employ as participants in inquiry.
Specifically, as such participants we seem required to
assess what it is we are capable of answering, and what it
is that we must answer.

Plutarch related the warning that

we should not be hasty to destroy what we may not be capable
of replacing or improving upon.

The thrust of this warning

is that we should not expose, or re-expose, ourselves to
demands or needs that have been satisfied.

On the other

hand, the status of these needs need not be guaranteed
simply because they have been satisfied.

It is possible

that they were satisif ied only because there was no reason
that they not be satisfied.

We are all familiar with the

political quip that some things are done only because they
can be done.

Blumenberg makes the point that some questions

are introduced because there is no reason that they should
not be answered.
The difficulty we face is in distinguishing such
questions from those which raise questions of real need.
In Part IV of The Legitimacy of the Modern Age,
Blumenberg presents a detailed analysis of Nicholas of Cusa
and Giordano Bruno as cases in point.
17
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Blumenberg does not so much settle these standards as point
out how certain questions are provoked.

But in this case

too the extremes of an intolerant dogmatism and enthusiasm
are, as Popper pointed out, to be avoided:

the first

because it believes it to be its good fortune that it can at
least answer the questions it must, the second because it
believes it must answer the questions it can.

When stated

like this, the modern age does seem to have a closer
relationship with "enthusiasm" than it does to dogmatism. 18
The advantage of describing ourselves as situated best when
we can avoid both of these extremes is that it allows us to
recognize and face the revolutionary's dilemma head on:

the

conjecture of new ideas requires rebellion, but this seems
to require that we simultaneously restrain the rebellion of
others--a rebellion which may too easily destroy that which
it cannot replace. 19

Revolution, therefore, issues

"reproaches" both forward and backward, and may justifiably
fear nothing more than an enthusiastic reception of its

Blumenberg spends much the entirety of Part Three
of The Legitimacy of the Modern Age--"The Trial of
Theoretical Curiosity"--making a similar point. We might
say that insofar as curiosity has been rehabilitated by
modernity, it opens the way for the possibility of
revolution. At the same time, its position within the
medieval schema as a vice--as a concern with the
superfluous, with things unnecessary for salvation--is
reoccupied by "enthusiasm."
18

This point also invites comparison with Arendt's
On Revolution, for she also points out the revolutionary's
need for authority.
19
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activities. 20

Dogmatism and revolution, insofar as they do

avoid the extremes, seek to hear what is strongest in the
other:

The demands of authority are less problematic for

dogmatism than is the demand for openness--but openness .is. a
problem for it.

On the other hand, the demand for openness

is less problematic for the revolutionary than is the demand
of authority--but authority is a problem for it as well.
This underscores the relationship between Blumenberg's
analysis of reoccupation and his emphasis on pre-history.
Reoccupation highlights not only the ways that ideas
function as answers to questions, but also much of the
"novelty" of ideas that is traceable to such functions.

For

instance, Blumenberg seeks to understand how it is that a
particular idea or theory seems to function successfully as
an answer at one time but not at another--in other words,
how it is thrust into the spotlight at one time, yet
relatively neglected at other times. 21

Blumenberg is not

denying that such theories are always "available," but he is

Stanley Cavell makes a similar point with respect
to an audience's response to a text. Rather than use the
terms dogmatism, revolution, and enthusiasm, as I have done
here, Cavell distinguishes between readers with whom the
text is "genial" and those who are the text's "feared"
readers, for whom it sets up reproaches against their
approach (Cavell 1989:11-12).
20

I interpret Blumenberg's article, "On a Lineage of
the Idea of Progress" (1974)--together with his claim, in
The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, to the effect that the
idea of "progress" was placed into service as an answer to
the question of the totality of history--to be undertaking
this kind of investigation.
21
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denying that we can answer the question concerning the
"rise" of a theory to prominence by simply tracing a
"substantive progression" (or self-activating tradition) in
a direct line from its earliest formulations and forerunners
to the "mature" product. 22

Instead, Blumenberg suggests

that a theory comes to prominence only when it can function
as answer--much like Kuhn's exemplary problem solution--to a
variety of questions (within a network of questions which it
has, to some extent, extended) .

In other words, we should

not be fooled into thinking that the power of a theory
resides simply in the directness of its claims, as a direct
response to an immediate and identifiable problem in the
field.

Nor should we try to give account of the strength of

these claims by tracing their "development" over many
generations until they have been honed into the instrument
they now are.

Rather, for Blumenberg the power of a theory

is its power of reoccupation--its ability to undergo the
kind of reshuffling that allows one to see it as serving in
hitherto unrequired capacities--but unrequired only because
these had been previously satisfied by other means.
Summary
Blumenberg makes the claim that the questions which a
text opens behind itself are those which unsettle answers,
Blumenberg's point might be fruitfully compared to
Steve Fuller's critique of narrative progressions (1991).
In this regard, see the comments made in Ingram (1993:30-1),
and Ingram (1994) .
22
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such that these answers can be understood as directed (or be
free to be directed) to the determination of other
questions.

These answers, in other words, are directed to

different matters than those to which we had understood them
to be directed.

At the same time, the questions to which we

believed these answers had responded now require a new
answer--a new determination--which is part of what we
understand the text as attempting to offer (another part
being its answers to questions which are pressing--which
have not received a solution) .

The importance of opening

questions both before and behind itself, therefore, is that
the text's novelty cannot be understood as a disposition
that is pointed only forward.

Instead, the disposition of

the text toward closing the gap between the determinate
questions to which it has responded and the indeterminacy of
expectations for which it has offered some determination is
one which opens questions in both directions:

it sheds new

light on the past and past texts, and raises new questions
concerning these, as well as opens new questions which point
forward.
A classic text, then, is not defined as a text that
deals with eternally unsettled questions or pressing
problems--a canon of great questions.

A classic text is one

which both broadens our concerns by opening questions that
lead into the past--and into "tradition"--and also opens
questions that reorient our present concerns.

CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION
The argument of this paper has been that Hans
Blumenberg's model of the logic of question and answer
provides a better solution to the problem of the
complementarity of dogmatism and criticism, raised by Kuhn,
than do the alternatives offered by Popper and Gadamer.
Gadamer's solution to this complementarity ends up
accomodating both dogmatism and criticism as aspects of a
dialogue (experience} that takes place within, and reforms
(re-confirms} the framework of tradition.

Popper's solution

to the complementarity ends up accomodating dogmatism and
criticism as aspects of a dialogue which perpetually breaks
free from that framework.

If the problem with Gadamer's

solution is that it threatens to suppress the emancipatory
possibilities offered by revolution, and thereby makes us
ideological supporters of tradition, then the problem with
Popper's solution is that its affirmation of revolutions in
permanance threatens to undercut the requisite continuity
and confirmation (reception of authority and reception by
authority} necessary to keep revolutions from being reduced
to a mere succession of self-cancelling, mutually impotent,
episodes.

In other words, the transfer of power and
137
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authority necessary to sustain revolution cannot occur
unless, and until, the determination of "where the real
power of our previous theories lies" is made.

But an

attitude of per_petual framework-breaking all-too-easily
overlooks and dispenses with the positive, enabling
conditions of our frameworks, and thereby undermines an
important component necessary for the deployment of the idea
of progress.

In short, Gadamer tips the balance of the

complementarity toward tradition, and Popper tips it toward
revolution.
In this conclusion, I will make a brief attempt to make
clearer how Blumenberg and Kuhn keep the balance from
permanently tipping to one side or the other.

Furthermore,

I will attempt to state more explicitly not only the
parallels between Kuhn's and Blumenberg's positions, but the
developments for our understanding of the ideas of progress
and revolution which result from their interaction.

The "essential tension," so dubbed by Kuhn, between
dogmatism and criticism, tradition and revolution, can be a
rather unhappy mix.

Blumenberg, no less than the others

considered in this paper, recognizes this.

I have called

attention to Blumenberg's misreading of Kuhn's understanding
of scientific revolutions at various points in this paper.
I want to renew their dialogue here--and at the same time
focus on Blumenberg's understanding of the essential
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tension--by citing the claim made by Blumenberg just before
he offers his critique of Kuhn.
In the progress of a science, the same thing takes
place--in exemplary fashion, almost as though in a
test tube, with greater clarity--that in more
diffuse manifestations keeps the general
historical process in motion: An established
system produces for itself the instruments with
which to secure itself thoroughly and to extend
the sphere of objects that it comprehends, and in
the process continually refines the forms in which
it is justified and applied, with the result that
in this way the system itself brings to light and
accentuates the data that go beyond what it is
able to master and to enclose within the
prescribed frame of the accepted assumptions.
This is the description of a logical situation
that Aristotle had already put under the heading
of aporia [difficulty of passage. lack of
resources] and that Kant had discussed as the
fundamental "transcendental dialectic." In both
cases the process of cognition itself forces the
abandonment of its presuppositions and the
introduction of new elementary assumptions, which,
while they do remove the situation from which
there was no way out. do not require the
shattering of the identity of the overall movement
that gave rise to the situation. (Blumenberg
1983 :465) (my emphasis)
I will now offset this passage with two taken from Kuhn.
The early attacks upon the resistant problem will
have followed the paradigm rules quite closely.
But with continuing resistance, more and more of
the attacks upon it will have involved some minor
or not so minor articulation of the paradigm, no
two of them quite alike, each partially
successful, but none sufficiently so to be
accepted as paradigm by the group. Through this
proliferation of divergent articulations (more and
more frequently they will come to be described as
ad hoc adjustments), the rules of normal science
become increasingly blurred. Though there still
is a paradigm. few practitioners prove to be
entirely agreed about what it is. Even formerly
standard solutions of solved problems are called
into question.
When acute. this situation is sometimes recognized
by the scientists involved. (Kuhn 1970: 83) (my
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emphasis)
In the sciences .... new approaches do not
ordinarily emerge simply when old ones stagnate,
cease to produce novelty. Instead, they await a
time when the traditional approach is seen to have
failed in resolving problems acknowledged to lie
within its competence. (Kuhn 1980:190) (my
emphasis)
Given the expositions of Blumenberg's and Kuhn's positions
throughout this paper as a backdrop, if one were to compare
the highlighted portions of these passages to one another
one would uncover a significant complementarity in their
respective understandings of the dynamics of the "essential
tension."
For both Blumenberg and Kuhn, aporia (defined as
difficulty of passage, or lack of resources) ultimately
motivates scientific revolutions.

However, as Blumenberg

suggests, although a "way out" is required, that way out
does not require the shattering of the identity of the
dynamic that gave rise to the aporetic situation.

Were we

to place this claim within the context of Kuhn's connnent
that the "acuteness" of the aporetic situation is only
sometimes recognized, then I would suggest that for both
Blumenberg and Kuhn revolutions are often "invisible" for
the following reason:

New determinations of a question by

means of a novel (revolutionary) answer often conceal the
fact that such answers occupy old question positions.

For

both Blumenberg and Kuhn, successful revolutions are often
invisible because they are not intentionally undertaken by
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agents following the demand of an imperative for revolutions
in permanence.

Revolutions, for Kuhn and Blumenberg, are

not simply the imposition and expansion of a new framework
of questions in place of the old framework--they are not
framework-leaping or framework-breaking events.

Instead,

revolutions succeed when they reoccupy the positions of the
old framework. 1

Blumenberg's fundamental criticism of

Gadamer is that tradition is not re-confirmed, but reoccupied.

Finally, because such reoccupation is concealed,

progress begins to look like either a simple accumulation
(or addition) of answers and problems (which overlooks
precisely how such answers may actually reoccupy old
question positions), or radical framework-breaking--by which
we always move into "roomier" frameworks, as Popper says.
For Blumenberg and Kuhn, the idea of progress can still be
deployed, though it means something very different from
either of these two alternatives:

reoccupation of the

framework of question positions, not its confirmation,
satisfies the conditions of continuity against which
progress (unblocking the way) can be identified.

Revolutions do, of course, introduce additional
questions which "extend" the framework.
1
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